The world in WW2 wasn't just divided into two opposing sides - the Allies versus the Axis, there were those who chose to stay neutral and others, who depending on how the war went, chose one side and switched later. Such was the case with a number of countries in Southeast Asia, especially those that were colonies of the Western countries when the Japanese over-ran them.
When Japan planned to go south, one of the things they did was to try and foment local unhappiness with the colonial governments. They did not lack willing collaborators. India already had a noteworthy and well-trained force in the form of the Indian Nation Army (INA), initially led by Mohan Singh. This eventually became an organised political and military force under Chandra Bose. To a smaller extent, Burma also had the same. After Japan conquered Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, Japan started local 'armies' with the aim of supplementing their own forces in case the Allies fought back.
This book explores the various forces in these territories, looking at their conception, training, efficacy, deployment, ending with an evaluation of the effort and its impact on post-war Southeast Asia's independence movement.
The Japanese never intended for these countries to gain independence, no matter what they said publicly during and after the war. This is clear from the Japanese's lack of coherent strategy on exploiting the native's eagerness to overthrow their colonisers. The idea of creating Japanese-trained armies was initially mired in the traditional rivalry between the army and navy. Then when the army came to dominate the effort, they did not appear to have a clear idea of how to deploy these armies. The exception was the INA which saw action in Imphal. The rest were not asked to play any important role at any time.
Why then did the locals signed up on the side of the Japanese? There are a number of reasons. Some really believed that the Japanese was serious when they promised to release Asians from the white men's grip, others just did it because the Japanese provide better food. The more sophisticated ones knew that this disruption would represent their best chance of gaining independence. They were not interested in being friends with the Japanese but they could certainly use a hand in trying to gain independence. What they didn't count on was the Japanese would eventually turn out to be like the new colonisers. That, together with the brutal ways they were treated by the Japanese, the ever harsher requisition of food, material and manpower, plus the turning of the war against the Japanese made many of these pivot towards the Allies once again. This is perhaps the most important takeaway from the book - the people in Southeast Asia who signed up for the Japanese-trained armies were rather opportunistic.
Yet although things did not turn out as they or the Japanese earlier envisaged, it would be mistaken to say that nothing came out of this effort. After the war, these Southeast Asian countries did gain independence and many of these who were trained in these armies became the head of the armed forces if not the head of state. This would complicate the post-war narrative of Japanese occupation in these countries yet serve to mend relationships with the Japanese speedily after the war.
This book, although a scholarly work, is not hard to read. Being no more than 200 pages makes it a quick read too. In the preface of this reprint, the author pointed out that the work has not been superseded despite it being more than 20 years old (40 years by now). Beyond recording a comprehensive history of the Japanese project in WW2, it gives the reader a chance to reflect on the independence movements in Southeast Asia and most of all helps the reader to understand why the WW2 narratives of Southeast Asian countries are so difference from that in China and in the West.
