Nomonhan 1939 (Stuart D. Goldman)

To most, WW2 started on 1 September 1939 with Germany's invasion of Poland. However Japan's involvement in WW2 is considered to only start on 7 December 1941 after they attacked Pearl Harbor. Yet the Japanese had been fighting for years in a more regional war in China because of their annexation of Manchuria. It wasn't only the Chinese they were fighting though, because of the unclear boundaries between what was then Manchukuo and Mongolia, the Japanese ended up also fighting a 'limited' war with the Russians. A serious one occured just before WW2 started in Europe, between May and August 1939 in a place known as Nomonhan to the Japanese, or Khalkhin Gol to the Russians.

This book by Prof. Stuart D. Goldman describes this relatively unknown incident called the Nomonhan Incident (or the Battle of Khalkhin Gol). But more than just describing the incident, the author put forth an important thesis: this battle, while relative small compared to others yet to come, and confined to a tiny, obscure area in the plains of faraway Mongolia, had a profound impact on how WW2 eventually developed. In particular it was because of this battle that Japan became convinced that they should avoid another conflict with Soviet Union, giving more force to those who argued that they should go down south for the resources that they need. And to prevent the US from intervening, they had to destroy the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, the rest, we all know.

The author developed his argument by taking the reader down two tracks. The first being the history associated with the Kwantung Army leading to the border disputes with the Russians. The second is the global context, setting out what was happening in other parts of the world (especially in Europe) and situating this incident within that larger context. With these in place, the author then explained first why the conflict took place and then how it led to subsequent developments in WW2.

Following the first track, besides the history related to the formation of the Kwantung Army, which was informative in itself, the author took pains to explain the concept of Gekokujo (下克上, literally "lower level overcoming upper level") which has been associated with the Japanese Army (less the Navy) and most frequently with the Kwantung Army. This is a strange concept that, as far as I know, is only present in the Japanese Army where mid-ranking officers either manipulated or openly defied their senior officers' commands to do what they wanted. The further away they were from the central command in Tokyo, the worse the transgressions. The author showed with many examples how this manifested itself in the Kwantung Army.

Further to their tendency to exhibit Gekokujo, they also had a sense of invulnerability which was heightened by their perception that the Russians were weak. And at one point indeed they appeared to be (pg 17). This together with the ineffective commands from Tokyo that the Kwantung Army commanders were determined to ignore, and the purposely vague border protection policies issued by the Kwantung Army commanders (pg 89) made for an inevitable showdown with the Russians - the question is what would the Russians do?

By way of introducing the Changkufeng Incident a year before the Nomonhan Incident, the author explained to the readers that the Russians probably felt that the time had come to put their foot down in their dealings with the Japanese, especially with the Kwantung Army. When the Japanese acted against the Mongolians (the allies of the Russians) in Nomonhan in 1939, the Russians decided that they had to teach the Japanese a lesson. The story then went on to describe in good details about the campaigns that took place in that period of  four months, at an exciting pace for a scholarly work. More importantly, throughout the description, the author kept an eye on Stalin's responses and decisions, which in contrast to the Japanese's perspective, was wide in its geopolitical considerations. And who can blame him, for the Soviet Union spanned both Europe and Asia and could find herself potentially fighting a two-front war which Stalin was determined to avoid.

The Japanese had no such worries, although they should. While arguably in the same theatre, 1939 was also when Japan was beginning to be caught in the quagmire in China. So while the Tokyo wanted to play down the Nomonhan Incident, the Kwantung Army would have none of it. But in an almost ridiculous fashion, the Kwantung Army could be so compelling that even Tokyo went along with them despite an Imperial Order.

General Nakajima, deputy chief of AGS (Army General Staff), flew to Hsinking with Imperial Order 343, commanding Kwantung Army to hold its position near the disputed frontier with "minimal strength" to ensure a quick end to hostilities and a prompt diplomatic settlement. But in meeting with Nakajima, the KwAHQ (Kwantung Army HQ) Staff, led by the Operations Sections, clung passionately to its convictions. Incredibly, Nakajima was won over by the staff's fervent spirit and gave verbal approval for Kwantung Army's general offensive to begin on September 10. (pg 150)

And so the slaughter on both sides started.

The author paid a reasonable attention to the Russian forces as well, never hiding the fact that their loses were equally appalling and that the incident, while celebrated for the bloody nose it gave to the Japanese, did not come at a small price for the Russians. Particularly enjoyable was to read about Marshall Zhukov who was given the first significant command of his career, coming in the wake of Stalin's purge of his more experienced commanders.

For a book that is no more than 180 pages, persuading readers about his thesis is an ambitious feat for the author. But he succeeded admirably. This is not to say that other scholars could not find reasons to disagree with him as he himself admitted in the Preface but at least in terms of academic rigor and logic, his case was compelling. Although many pieces of his evidence were circumstantial, the use of the dates of various events on the side of the Russians seemed to suggest that Russian reactions to the geopolitical scenario in relation to Germany, Japan and subsequently to Poland hinged much on the Nomonhan Incident and its conclusion.

On the Japanese side according to Colonel Hayashi Saburo, one of the General Staff officers, there was general recognition that they should leave Russia alone and from then on, and should only make their move south (into Southeast Asia).  This compares well with what was said by Japanese Scholar Kazutoshi Handō (半藤一利) in Showa Shi (昭和史), where both Masanobu Tsuji and Takushiro Hattori were said to have decided that "in future, go south." And going south meant going after Pearl Harbor too.

This book is surely a good place to start for those of us wanting to get an introduction to the Nomonhan Incident. But to say that it is but an introductory book is unfair because it comes with a huge amount of information, all organised logically, and presented persuasively.

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Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze (Peter Harmsen)

Most Chinese take 7 Jul 1937, the day of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (卢沟桥事变) as the day when China officially went to war with Japan. Immediately after the incident, Chiang Kai-shek found himself out of an excuse to not confront the Japanese on Chinese soil. He decided to make his stand in Shanghai and this book is about that battle, known in the Chinese literature as 淞滬會戰.

At 300 pages, this is a fairly short book by normal standards. The brisk and flowing style adopted by the author made the book an enjoyable read. This book is obviously based on good research and has the merit of showing many good archive pictures. On top of that, it also provides the answer to a question I have had for many years - why do Chinese soldiers that appeared in movies I saw as a child wear German helmets? Does it not make them the bad guys? This book is the only one I have come across that gives a good account of the close relationship between the Chinese government and the Germans, explaining the many German military advisers used by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) in the 1930s.

The author, Peter Harmsen, is particularly good at articulating scenes of various types (although I suspect that this is helped by my own exposure to the pictures and movies I watched as a child). I would point to two examples, the first one was what went on in the Great World Amusement Centre, taking readers into the place itself, almost helping one to see what various vendors were doing. I thought I could hear the music coming out of the crackling grammaphone. The other, in contrast, was the gruesome fighting scenes of death and destruction. I confess again, that being exposed from young to pictures and movies made of that era has helped me to visualise (maybe inaccurately) what the author described, but that should not take anything away from his ability to attend to the smallest yet important details.

There are however lapses that reduces my enjoyment of the book. The prologue talked about the Xi-an Incident in which Chiang was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang, the Young Marshal as he was called, in a bid to force Chiang to come to terms with the Communists to fight the Japanese together. For such an important event, I wonder why the author did not mention it by name, and the greater ommission was Zhang Xueliang's name. Yet he would bother to interject his otherwise flowing narrative with stories that seem to come at the wrong time, or which are of no use to the reader. An example of such was the story on Dai Li (pg 145) which interrupted what was an exciting description of the brutal battle that was going on.

The author also made a strange comment on pg 64 about the tragedy of the Black Saturday. This was when the Chinese bombers sent to bomb the Japanese cruiser Izumo dropped their bombs in the most crowded parts of Shanghai instead, killing only Chinese civilians. The author said that 'the tragedy could have been prevented by Japan.' I cannot appreciate the thoughts behind what he said; was he trying to be sarcastic or ironic, or was he really putting the blame on the Japanese? I hope he had not said it.

That said, the perceptive author provided much for a reader to reflect upon.

The first of these was about the city itself. What was Shanghai really like in that era? If there was a 'limited war', I would say that this battle was the most 'limited' insofar as territory is concerned. With Japan's total restrain concerning the International Settlements, one got the surreal sense that the battle could be raging along one side of a fence maiming people indiscriminately, while on the other side, people, safe behind the fences of the International Settlements, watched on. Foreign reporters could still be staying in a five-star hotel that continued to operate as normal.

But 'limited' is also a misnomer in this battle, as with all others involving the Chinese. For Chinese commanders always seemed to believe that there were unlimited Chinese to die. Those frontal attacks against well-entrenched enemies in movies looked like propaganda, only that they were unfortunately accurate (pg 53). No one was called to account for the fiasco of Black Saturday. A captain, who claimed to be involved in it, even gave an interview to the press and tried to explained why it happened (pg 63).

I also could not help noticing that the one thing the that the Chinese Army seemed to consistently do successfully was to withdraw quietly at night from a salient they held in the day. The Japanese sometimes did not even know until days later. The one exception was battle for the Sihang Warehouse where some 425 Chinese soldiers took a last stand against the Japanese. This battle was described very well in the book.

Overall, this book is a good read. Although I have my complaints, these are probably due to my unfair expectations of it being more scholarly when it was written as a 'popular' history book. This book is recommended if for none other reason than there being very few English language works on the war in China during this era.

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