Old Shanghai - Gangsters In Paradise (Lynn Pan)

Shanghai at the beginning of last century was a city bubbling with energy and exuberance. It was a strangely workable cohabitation of British and French 'leased territories' and sovereign Chinese territory governed by an assortment of Chinese authorities. Authorities was usually not an elected or appointed one, it might be an authority that came as a result of military (or militia) prowess, but it was more likely that authority stemmed out of the control of the underworld. This book traces the lives of the interesting and important characters of the times to give the reader a full impression of the colourful city that was Shanghai.

Shanghai, like the rest of China, was in a tumultuous time in the first half of the century. Much wealth was in display co-existing with much poverty and deprivation. It was in the middle of the power struggles immediately after the fall of the Ching Dynasty with Sun Yat Sen's Kuomintang struggling to unite even the south of the country. After him, Chiang came to power and together with Big Ears Du, eradicated the Communists in what is known as the White Scare. And then the Japanese came and enticed Wang Jinwei to split with Chiang. All these are vividly captured in this book with much nuance and colour. This is a book detailing the power-plays, corruption, and ruthlessness of all involved. It brought to live different characters and how their lives were intertwined as each struggled for a piece of the city.

When I was reading the book, I wondered where to place it. It is not fiction per se, not historical fiction, yet not quite scholastic history. The author did not claim that it is a scholastic work; she provided no footnotes nor references. Yet I did not detect any fabrication anywhere (although I must admit that I am not an expert in the field), the people were real, their relationships true, and the events did take place. It therefore plays a role in informing readers of the history of Shanghai without being heavy. Also lending credibility to the book is the author's background. Not only was she born and grew up in Shanghai, she has enough academic and professional credentials to give one confidence in the thoroughness and honesty in her work.

This interesting book probably hard to find now which is unfortunate. People who are interested in knowing pre-Second World War Shanghai can find many useful materials in Chinese. Much less is available in English. This is therefore one of those rare books that fills the gap. Adding to that a higher readable style, readers will surely find this book one not to be missed.


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张学良口述历史 (唐德刚)

This book carries great promise, if not responsibilities. Alas, it did not deliver on either. It was not that the author did a bad job, it was a project that failed because the object of the book, Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang (张学良) did not understand the nature of oral history and was therefore uncooperative. In the end, the author published the verbatim interview scripts, responsibly allowing future scholars access to the raw data for their own analysis and hopefully be able to come to an informed conclusion about Zhang, his life and times.

Zhang was an important person. His life was a colourful one, not only was he intimately involved in the many important events in the modern history of China (for example the Manchurian Incident), he was the co-mastermind of the Xi'an Incident (the other was Yang Hucheng 杨虎城). Much controversy still surrounds the event, with China (mainland) and Taiwan having different narratives about the incident and interpretations of the man's motivation and therefore his attitudes.What better way then to hear from the man himself?

It was with this expectation that I started the book. But what I read in the preface dampened my enthusiasm considerably. This book that was supposed to answer questions would not. If you watch the video of the interview, you would understand why. Zhang, in his old age, was no unlike many others; he has the tendency to boast about his achievements and his extra-marital affairs, he suffers from lapses in memory, and at times kept repeating the same thing over and over again. What I find most amusing are the occasions when he would say "I can't tell you who this person is", and almost as sure as the sun will rise, he would follow his next sentence with the name of the person whom he could not tell.

Yet despite its failure to live up to its expectations, the book is not without value. He did help to clarify a few things if only through one's own analysis. For example, when he told the author that there were people who asked him why he bothered to come to Wang's help after a failed attempt at Wang's life (pg. 236), the reader could immediately tell that many preferred Wang dead. He was also the best person to give insights into the workings of the Northeastern Army (奉军) and also some of the personalities (pg. 362). But personally, I think the most valuable part of the book is the epilogue provided by the author. This is a good piece of analytical work that is persuasively argued and engagingly written. This book would have been worth the read just for that part.

Like the author, my impression of the Young Marshal was deeply discounted after reading the book and watching the video mentioned above. He had a colourful life that is only available to people who were born in his times. He was involved in some of the most defining events of modern Chinese history. Yet as an old man, he was like many others, and his failure to maintain respectability during these interviews washes off the mystic that has accompanied him throughout his life, even and especially in detention. Perhaps like what the author said, if not for the  Xi'an Incident, Zhang Xueliang is nothing.

PS. The book came with a few pictures of Zhang and also his calligraphy. I wonder why he wrote his own name in simplified Chinese. I cannot explain that.

李宗仁回忆录（上） / （李宗仁/唐德刚）

Li Zongren (李宗仁) is an important person in the history of modern China. A member of the Kuomintang (KMT) government, he rose to the position of Vice-President of Taiwan, next only to Chiang Kai-shek. What made him even more interesting was his eventual return to mainland China in 1965 breaking ties with the KMT.

This is the first of his two-volume autobiography and covered events all the way from his childhood years (which he considerately limited to the first two chapters) to the end of the Northern Expedition, rounding off with a brief mention of his role in Zhang Xueliang's (张学良) submission to the central government in what is known as the 'Northeast changing of flags' (东北易帜).

This book is invaluable for the details that he provided about the various important events that he was involved in such as the unification of Guangxi and Guangdong and the string of battles in the Northern Expedition. I regret not having anticipate this level of details otherwise I would have brought a map with me to follow the advances.I would also prepare myself to take notes for future reference. Beyond the historical facts that he wrote about, the book was also decorated with plenty of insider information and his opinion of the people that are known to us. The most scathing of his criticism was reserved for Chiang who came across as petty, suspicious, and devious, but highly savvy politically. There are other events which I hope he had given more coverage, for example the Shanghai Massacre in which many Communists were tortured and murdered in the name of cleaning up the Kuomintang and 东北易帜 mentioned above. Li being one of the insiders would have been able to throw much light on these events instead of the superficial treatment which he gave to them.

The reader would not fail to notice and surely lament on the condition that China was in at that time. Warlords, big and small, ran amok throughout the land. Some provided some semblance of governance, others were just exploiting the common men for what they were worth, every one of had to maintain a huge army, all of them hoping to exploit the weaknesses of the other to consolidate and expand their territories. The various regional armies were constantly going through 新编 (formation or constitution), 收编 (absorption by another army), or 重编 (re-consitution); that tells the reader how volatile and unreliable the warlord governments were. And almost exactly like how it was like in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, alliances of convenience were easily formed and just as easily betrayed. Former enemies could one day sit down and reminiscent about the 'good old times' when they fought battles on opposite sides while seemingly paying no attention to the thousands who had died in those years, Han Chinese against Han Chinese. It is no wonder modern Chinese governments are most paranoid about not letting China descend into factions again. One wonder how the Sino-Japanese War would pan out had it not been for the wasteful civil wars fought in the decades prior to 1937.

The writing style is not easy for the modern reader. Although the style is not classified as traditional Chinese (文原文), it is by no means the modern Chinese that is used today. This makes reading difficult at first until I started getting used to it, and in fact started to appreciate the beauty of it.Readers must also be ready for the image that Li has portrayed himself in this book. He has made himself looked like an idealistic follower of Sun Yat San's revolution and had no interest in politics and power. Too many times, he also gave himself the roles of the wise seer who was able to counselled the right moves at critical junctures. Although I do not know enough to dispute these, I find too many of such incidents mentioned to make this book somewhat self-serving. But if you look beyond these, this hugely rewarding book is a must-read for all students of the modern history of China.

Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Michael A. Barnhart)

This is a book that explores why Japan went to war in China in the 1930s and got herself entangled in a war with the British, Dutch, and most of all, the Americans, guaranteeing their own eventual destruction. The story takes the reader back to the end of the First World War when the the military learned two lessons from Germany's defeat:

1. The army should avoid politics so that politics would not interfere with the army.
2. Japan needs to find a way to keep herself economically self-sufficient or risk an inevitably decline given the rapid grow in her population.

Ironically, the former, instead of keeping politics out of the army, the army came to dominate politics so much so that the political system in Japan almost ceased to exist by the late 1930s. And in the case of the latter, the quest to avoid decline would eventually lead to her near-annihilation.

Japan's story in the 1920s and 30s is quite an amazing one. Today, depending on how they see that period of their history, people are still arguing whether Japan waged a war or aggression or self-preservation. Japan was facing a population explosion at that time, they needed land to emigrate their people to and they needed resources which Japan scarcely had. Couple this with her recent victory over both China (1894/5) and Russia (1905), not only did the opportunity presented itself in the shape of Manchuria, it also gave the army the confidence to pursue what they deemed the politicians were not capable of. When the early policies of bribery and working with the regional warlord (in this case Zhang Zhuolin) did not work out, the Japanese murdered him, driving his son to eventually align the Northeastern provinces with the central government of Chiang Kaishek. That developed into the Manchurian Incident giving the Japanese the opportunity to occupy the provinces which later unexpectedly led to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. One thing led to another, and in no time the Americans were openly showing displeasure with the Japanese.

This book looks at the events from both the Japanese and American perspectives. It was like a movie jumping from scene to scene, alternating between what the Japanese were contemplating and how the Americans were responding. If one wants to know how politicians in the US engage in discussions, arguments and decision-making, this book has it all. Many people are familiar with the doctrine of "graduated escalation" McNamara introduced in the lead up to the Vietnam War. It is not that different in the Second World War; the Americans would respond to a Japanese escalation, who in turn would take some measures in the belief that the Americans were go to suffocate them. The Americans, on seeing the Japanese not backing down, would consider them belligerent and take more severe measures, in the end, Pearl Habor was quite inevitable, and so would the Japanese's surrender.

This very detailed book is full of important information and would be of immense interest to the enthusiast who wants to know the longer story of Japan's step-by-step journey to war with the Americans. In a sense this is more complete than an earlier book that I read, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta. However, this one is much harder to reader compared to Hotta's book which was written in a more story-telling style. Still, a reader who makes it through the book will be rewarded with a good understanding of the unfortunate circumstances that drew both the Japanese and Americans into the final showdown.


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东京审判:被忘却的纽伦堡 (Etienne Jaudel/杨亚平/程兆奇)

This book on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East is translated from French, originally titled Le procès de Tokyo: Un Nuremberg oublié by Etienne Jaudel. It is a small volume and reads more like a dissertation than a book. Short as it is, this book has its value; for those who have not read much about the Tribunal, this book gives a very good overview of the various aspects of the tribunal, such as the prosecutors, the accused, the judicial proceedings and the criticism of the various aspects of the Tribunal since. More than that, the author actually has a thesis – the Tribunal, as flawed as it was, was important in giving closure to the victims and the families who suffered terribly in the hands of the Japanese in the Second World War.

Many political scientists and legal experts who study the Tribunal questioned the legality of the proceedings. This became especially so after Richard H. Minear published Victors' Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial which got many to start looking at the convicted as victims of miscarried justice. Jaudel gave a good account of the difficulties and disagreements in the literature. These include the sparing of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito (pg. 5, 32); the concept of Crime Against Peace having no precedence (pg. 67); the procedural issues (pg. 12, 52) and the suitability of the general prosecutor, Joseph Keenan (pg. 13).

His perspective is different however. To him, a crime so great deserves punishment for those accountable and while the proceedings were not without flaws, the defendants were given due representation including the provision of fifteen defence lawyers (pg. 35). And although the type of evidence admitted was not like those in a usual criminal trial, the circumstances and the deliberate destruction of documents by the Japanese at the end of the war made it necessary for personal diaries and evidence not produced under oath (pg. 52) to be admitted. Furthermore, the author asked, could one expect that the accused be only convicted after there was no longer any doubt in any part of the proceedings? He reminded readers that the accused had all the legal rights accorded by the prosecution and more importantly, the prosecution had the moral grounds to prosecute because they represent countries that did not commit the same crimes (pg. 148).

Admittedly this Tribunal was different from the Nuremburg Trials because the political structure in Japan and Germany were different. In the case of Germany, it was much easier to identify the culprits because they reigned supreme during the war. Japan on the other hand, had ten prime ministers in that time. With power seemingly diffused among the Emperor, the cabinet and the military, it is hard to establish who should take overall responsibilities for the war and the atrocities resulting from it. From the start, the Tribunal was besieged with the problem of whether it was individual crimes or collective crimes the accused were prosecuted for (pg. 39) and with such a confusing administrative structure, the author felt that it was just to convict the accused so long as the prosecution could prove that the accused have direct or indirect involvement in the policy-making process involving the war.

Two judges in the panel of 12 needs special mention here. The first is Judge Radhabinod Pal who was dissenting and would later write a book to explain his position (Pal, 1953). He was accused by a Japanese author, Saburo Ienaga, of being partial to the accused because Pal was anti-communist and China was slowly drifting towards Communism during the trial (Saburo Ienaga, pg. 201). This is hard to prove especially when Ienaga himself was accused of being a communist. However, the credibility of the Judge took a bit of a hit when it was revealed here that he missed 109 days out of 423 during the trials, making him the biggest absentee (pg. 47).

The second judge is Judge Bert Röling who was also dissenting. He was among the people who believed that it was right not to put Emperor Hirohito on trial because he was just a figure-head and did not really have a say (pg. 143). This is ironic because it was precisely because of this that many felt that the Tribunal was a farce (pg. 145). This case is instructive for it highlights the fact that while people many agree that the Tribunal was less than impeccable, they were of the opinion for different reasons. This lack of agreement among the critics of the Tribunal may actually strengthen its legitimacy.

This book is marred by lapses, some of which are minor like the exact dates when Yamashita left for the Philippines which had no material impact on this book (pg. 33, 78, 80, 137, 151) but others  are major  (pg. 37, 49, 60, 62) such as the date that Japan withdrew its membership of the League of Nations (pg. 78). Fortunately, the translator, 程兆奇 did a good job checking the facts and correcting them in the footnotes. What I personally like about the author was his willingness to consider non-scholastic work which he qualified (pg. 20). I think pure scholarly work done in the scholastic tradition is important because it is on this that future knowledge is built. Unfortunately this always leaves the output dry and the physical scenes incomplete. I found myself constantly forming images informed by pictures from books or even scenes from the television programmes especially when reading works on China in that era. I hope more scholars would consider non-scholastic works but of course with qualifications and proper citations.

Finally, two points made by the author is worth repeating here. First of all, he, in response to Minear’s term ‘Victors’ Justice’, proposed that the Tribunal could also be called ‘Losers’ Justice’ because the judges in the Tribunal were all from countries that have suffered under the Japanese, they therefore represent their civilians who have suffered when they were losers (pg. 65). Secondly, a position not widely considered, is the fact that the outcome of the Tribunal ironically relieved the Japanese of their war guilt, for now they can say that it was the responsibility of those convicted (pg. 150) that perpetuated the atrocities and cruelty throughout Asia and brought Japan to the brink of destruction.

Reference
Ienaga, S. (1979). The Pacific War, 1931-1945 : A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II. NY:The Pantheon Asia Library.

Pal, R. (1953). International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Dissentient Judgement. Kolkata:Sanyal & Co.

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太平洋戰爭 (家永三郎/何欣泰 ) The Pacific War 1931-1945 (Saburo Ienaga)

To many, the Pacific War is geographically limited to the eastern side of the Pacific Ocean, extending furthest south to the Coral Sea and west to the Philippines. It is also chronologically limited to the period between 8th December 1941 and 2nd September 1945. To the Japanese and Chinese however, the Pacific War extends to China and Southeast Asia and started on 18th September 1931, when the Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria. This distinction is important: to many Americans, Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack, requiring a full retaliatory response. To the Japanese, it was the outcome of the sanctions that the USA placed upon them, and having no  way out, they had to attack the USA in the hope they would sue for peace. These sanctions were put in place in step with the escalation of Japan's conquest in China, leading to the most drastic embargo of oil as Japan invaded Indochina, which could be traced back to Japan's actions in China. To the Japanese, the Pacific War is a 15-year war and their ultimate near-devastation is to be traced to 1931, which is why the characters that appear in Japanese and Chinese literature on the war is a lot more colourful and well-developed than the fleeting mention that they get in Western literature.

This book by Saburo Ienaga is a survey of the events leading to Japan's ultimate defeat and the conditions in Japan throughout that period. The author's motivation is to educate the post-war generation about Japan's recent past, and more importantly, to counter the resurgent right-wing narrative in Japan. In doing so, not only did he discuss the military and cabinet decisions, he also provided a view into the controls the military put place to ensure that the populace remained docile and abiding and would not raise any objections to the military's adventures.

In the 1920s and throughout the 1930s, militarism was pervasive and this started to make inroads into schools through systematic perversion of the school curriculum as well as the increase in imperialistic-mindedness of the teachers. There were those who tried to resists, but by 1940, there was largely no more open dissent (pg. 117) and even the "intellectual community not only caved in under pressure but accommodated with alacrity to the new order" (pg. 121). This being the case, and with the constant bombardment of news of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy scoring victories after victories over any adversaries, it became impossible for the Japanese civilian to know the truth.

The author's main concern was that there never seemed to be a time when the post-war Japanese society evaluated Japan's history in the early part of the 20th century. War memories started to fade and there are even signs that the war apologists were beginning to make a come back. Indeed, there were even people who advocated the reassessment the war because excessive emphasis on war responsibility "would produce a guilt-ridden nation," (pg. 253). And as if to prove his point, Inenaga published a draft of a Japanese history textbook for high school based on his New Japanese History. The draft was rejected by the Ministry of Education in 1952 because they did not like the way he depicted certain events, this resulted in him bringing a lawsuit to the ministry.

I cannot claim to be a scholar in Japanese literature on the War, but I observed a few interesting perspectives of Emperor Hirohito from the few works I have read. The right-wing perspective is that the Emperor might have a role in starting the war, but it was a just war and he did the right thing. Among those who disagree with the war and admitted to the atrocities of the Imperial Japanese Army are two different views. One is that the Emperor had no choice and was not really in control of events. Respected academic and author, Kazutoshi Handō is of this opinion. The other perspective, to which this author subscribed, is that the Emperor should bear the responsibilities and at the end of the war, with everyone suffering the most difficult conditions, and the myth of the Emperor shattered, people were ready to indict him had the Allies so decided. Finally, there are those who chose to side-step the role of the Emperor. This is an interesting issue for further exploration and I hope that the book I'm currently reading would help to shed some light.

As a small volume, it is impossible for the author to go into enough details of any events or any aspect of the lives of the Japanese. I started reading the Chinese translation of the book and found it hard, mainly because of the style that I'm not used to. The English translation is much easier to read but seem to lack a certain depth. However, those who are interested in getting one Japanese perspective (a left-leaning one) of the Pacific War will find this book useful.

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The Manchurian Myth (Rana Mitter)

A little after 10.30 pm on September 18, 1931, a bomb went off at a section of the railway line belonging to the Southern Manchuria Railway. Although located in Manchuria, the railway was the property of the Japanese, having secured it from the Russians after the Russo-Japanese War. The event was the brainchild of two army officers from the Kwantung Army, Ishiwara Kanji (石原莞尔) and Itagaki Seishiro (板垣征四郎). Their intention was to create an excuse for the Kwantung army to send their troops into Mukden (now Shenyang) as part of their plan to occupy Manchuria. This is today known as the Mukden Incident or Manchurian Incident (9-1-8 Incident as known to the Chinese, 九一八事变). This incident would launch the 15-Year War with China, as it is known in Japan.

Manchuria was made up of the Three Eastern Provinces of China (东三省) and was the power-base of Zhang Xueliang (张学良), popularly known as the 'Young Marshal' (少帅). Zhang had a good-size army, but was told not to resist the Japanese. Zhang himself was not in Fengtian, the capital of Shenyang when the incident took place and neither were his deputies. In a short time, the Kwantung Army occupied Fengtian and in a few months, the rest of the three provinces.The Incident would precipitate a long list of discussion topics and scholarly research including the effectiveness of the League of Nations, the motivation of Chiang Kaishek, then leader of China, the stain on Zhang's reputation hence, and so on. Few, however, ventured into the lives of the Chinese caught in the unexpected turmoil, fewer have explored their attitudes towards the occupation.

In this book, Professor Rana Mitter attempted just that. But more, he wanted to explore why many in the occupied provinces even collaborated with instead of resisting the Japanese. This is dangerous grounds to tread. No Chinese today today would admit to not resisting or at least hating the Japanese during the occupation. As such, the author could only look to official documents, newspapers, records and also known events to reconstruct the climate in Manchukuo, as the three occupied provinces were known after they were made a puppet state by the Japanese. Prof Mitter's research question was this: how was the Kwantung Army, with relatively few troops in the area, able to control an area over 350,000 square miles with a population of 30 million with it own strength alone? Did they enlist the help of the local population since help was unlikely to come from Japan given the Japanese government's extreme disapproval of the incident?

Indeed the Kwantung Army was able to enlist widespread collaboration of many Chinese including the elites (pg. 6), local leaders (pg. 72), local warlords like Ma Zhanshan, and one might even argue, Chiang himself, for his assent to the Tanggu Truce was tacit agreement to the Japanese occupation. The commoners were however, largely indifferent; this applies to those from either side of the border separating intramural China (关内) from the three eastern provinces. The elites and students in intramural China were indignant to the occupation but the commoners were not really concerned.

This is a complex problem. Although in contemporary China, everyone considers the three eastern provinces as integral to China, this was not always the case. While the Qing Dynasty was by then no more, the Manchus, who originated from the three eastern provinces, after differentiating themselves deliberately from the Han Chinese, made it difficult for the Han Chinese in the 1920s and 30s to see the three provinces as part of China proper. The occupation of the provinces did not appear to many Chinese as a violation of their own country (pg. 187). Even among those living in the occupied provinces, who by then were overwhelmingly Han Chinese (pg. 23), there was little evidence of active resistance. This might be down to two principal reasons. Firstly, the fear of reprisal. The Japanese were ready to take extremely brutal measures against those suspected of engaging in subversive activities (pg. 112-113). Secondly, non-resistance could mean that life went on as usual and in some cases, life even got better than under Zhang (pg. 56, 119, 122, 124). Adding to this was the fact that only a small portion of the locals had enough knowledge to understand what was going on (pg. 99), it therefore comes as no surprise that Manchukuo was more or less peaceful in its years. This state of affairs was similarly depicted by Cordes (2013) in his travelogue where he described the indifference he witnessed among the Chinese in Manchukuo, painfully living their cheap lives which could be taken away from them at any moment. This was also more or less how Chi (2004) depicted the lives of the Chinese in her novel. Some were resentful of the Japanese, but they largely went on living their lives by avoiding the Japanese where possible.

Which goes counter to the contemporary narrative from China about the determined resistance and even uprising against the Japanese. And if there was indeed resistance, it was mainly through propaganda efforts made by the elites and students in intramural China, far away from Manchukuo. Armed resistance was carried out by bandits who were ever ready to plunder the commoners when necessary and at times they would think nothing of switching sides (pg. 175). Organised armed resistance was dominated by people with nothing to lose, the bankrupt peasants and bandits (pg. 197).

But lest one thinks that Chinese were generally unpatriotic and would gladly identify with the Japanese, it must be stressed that they were never in doubt of their identity. Against the reality of the non-resistance policy of Chiang, what could a commoner do? Help was not forthcoming from the own government (KMT) nor from their most recent ruler (Zhang) and even less likely from an noncommittal League of Nations (see the findings of the Lytton Commission). Life had to go on, so most went about it pragmatically, fully aware of the Japanese presense and brutality but finding a way to cope.

Prof Mitter can be an engaging writer. This is evident from his other book, Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1941 (Mitter 2013). But the book under review is adapted from this PhD thesis and I must say that theses are seldom written to engage. While I'm sure this book has been edited for readability, the thesis undertone is still widely felt. Having said that, one must recognise the value of the work. If nothing, it presents the complexity of nationalism in China then. In contrast to what is popularly brandished about today, Chinese in all strata of the society were able to adjust and accommodate the reality of Japanese occupation. We are not talking about a few black sheeps, we are talking about a whole society. This is unlikely to be palatable to the Chinese government of today. They have conscientiously sought to portray that part of history as one of Japanese brutality and Chinese resistance. Some strategies they have used include blaming Chiang for his policy of non-resistance (correctly in my view) and instead using his army to pursue the Communists, and fervently referring to Manchukuo as 伪满洲国 (fictitious Manchukuo) to stress its illegitimacy (compare the title of Chi's novel in the Chinese and the Taiwanese editions). The truth, at least at the commoners' level, is more of ambivalence on one side of the border and trying to maintain life as usual on the other.

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Chi, Z. J. (迟子建) (2004). 伪满洲国. Beijing, China, 人民文学出版社.

Cordes, E. (柯德士) (2013). 沉睡的与惊醒的“满洲国”. Liaoning, China, 辽宁人民出版社.

Mitter, R. (2013). Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945. NY, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

民國史抗戰篇：烽火八年 (唐德剛)

This book is a selection of Professor Tong Te Kong's works. Some are papers published in journals, others are his papers presented at conferences and a few were his editorials in the newspapers; there are even a couple of letters he wrote in reply to people who wrote in with comments about his works.

Professor Tong was born in China in 1920 and was in his teens in the tumultuous years when China was resisting Japan. He attained his PhD in Columbia University and stayed on in the US, becoming a naturalised citizen. This background is important because being an American citizen, he had the freedom to write without having to take sides, Chinese or Taiwanese. This is an important quality when one writes about China's modern history, for both sides (less the Taiwanese nowadays) try to narrate the story from their own perspectives, leaving one an incomplete if not biased picture of the history not made up by the narrative from the other side. 

Although a collection of essays, Prof Tong's position is a consistent one and the chronoligcal arrangement of the essays makes following the events easy. To the author, once the Japanese were given a foothold on the Asian mainland, opportunities were abundant for all kinds of conflict with the Chinese armed forces, and the Japanese (especially the Kwantung Army) made use of it to the fullest (pg. 21), culminating in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that kicked-off the Second Sino-Japanese War proper. However, the situation following the incident was not only a series of battles, there were also political intrigues and double-crossing. The most famous of these no doubt is Wang Jingwei's defection from the KMT setting up an alternative government in the fallen Nanjing. A good number of chapters dealt with this and since one of the players was Prof Tong's father-in-law, his account of the incident has added weight. The value of these few chapters is not just in the special insights he was able to give, but his good analysis of why Wang is today considered the traitor of the first order. And it is just as well that a significant part of this book is on this treachery for if there is a thread running through the book, it is that of duplicity.

Besides Wang's own betrayal, there was also Chiang himself dabbling in such some rather dubious episodes when the need arises. His own management of the situation with the Japanese is a case in point. On the one hand he whipped up the nationalistic fervour among the students but on the other he sent his agents to talk peace with the Japanese (pg. 30). A similar ploy was employed when he was dealing with the Americans. At that stage though he was deep in the war with the Japanese, when it suited him, he would intentionally give the Americans the impression that he might seek a separate peace with the Japanese (pg. 303) just so that he could continue to blackmail the Americans.

However, the most chilling instance of betrayal of all was how Stalin might have dealt with China. It is not generally known, but it was said in the book (pg 261) that Stalin contemplated a deal with Japan in which they would split China into two, much like how he and Hitler split Poland. This is not something beyond Stalin, and if it happened, the history of China and indeed, the Second World War would be different. In the end, the only ones that seem to be straight-dealing are the Germans. (There is a story about the Oskar Trautmann, ambassador of Germany to China that bears reading, pg. 170).

Having been brought up on a diet of Western scholastic journals, I was rather amused by the style of Prof Tong. The Chinese language, like English, has been increasingly 'simplified' to make it 'user-friendly'. Prof Tong however, continued to write in a more traditional way and while sacrificing
'user-friendliness', he has shown me how the Chinese language, when used correctly, can be  economical but elegant. Yet at the same time, he used words that one would never see in Western scholastic work, such as the Chinese version of 'bullshit' (pg. 257).

Prof Tong gave a balanced in writing this book, being a scholar who must have intimate contact with colleagues from China, Taiwan and Japan, he has honed the skills required to carefully present his case while avoiding unnecessarily upsetting anyone. Despite that, when he thinks that his case is strong, he would not hesitate to say it for what it is. As an example, he was not afraid to give an unflattering description of the KMT soldiers (pg.13) or to smash the common CCP narrative of how much they contributed in resisting the Japanese (pg. 270). Yet at the same time, where credit is due, he would not be stingy about it (pg. 174). Similarly, while he obviously had great respect for the Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang (whom he had a chance to interview), he was quite ready to say that Zhang was naive (pg. 183) and even rash (pg. 353) in .

The author was obviously learned, just a clarification on whether the Marco Polo Bridge was supposed to be 《卢沟桥》 or 《芦沟桥》could be the subject of a paper that quoted very good examples. His own experience as a teenager in the war, his relations to people who were important players in those days, and his work as an oral historian all contributed to his huge base of knowledge. Add to this his very interesting and engaging style, I find his books well-worth reading and cannot wait to start on his other books in my collection.

"The reporter knows nothing but probes persistently hoping to hit the sweet spot which will induce the interviewee to start talking. The researcher, on the other hand, starts with a hunch. He probes in the hope of hitting the sweet spot which will cause the interviewee to bottle up, and that's it, the hunch is confirmed."
- Prof Tong on the difference between a reporter and a researcher (pg. 105)

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百年家族-张学良 （李翠莲）

This is yet another book on the Young Marshal, Zhang Xueliang, this time written by a Chinese scholar (as compared to Taiwanese). Although most of the book is on the Young Marshal, the first quarter of it is on his father, Zhang Zhuolin. The inclusion of the elder Zhang is useful, for it gives the reader the background of the Young Marshals' life, his upbringing and in particular how his father has influenced the direction of his life.

Any book on Zhang Xueliang would not miss the Xi'an Incident, and to a lesser extent, the Manchurian Incident, this book is no exception. However, the author took a broader view of Zhang's life and so did not give a disproporationate amount of attention to just these two incidents. Instead, she focused on the various important events that took place throughout his life, including his more than half century of internment and more importantly, the different people that are important in his life: his father, his first wife Yu Fengzhi, his second wife Edith Zhao, his siblings and most all, Chiang.

Although there was no chapter dedicated to Chiang, he was mentioned throughout the book and invariably in a bad light. All decisions made cast him as a devious, selfish and crafty leader, unworthy of a loyal and somewhat naive Zhang. As a book published in China shortly after the Cultural Revolution, it is not surprising that the author took on such a position and tone. Unfortunately this makes the book come across as biased and may lead the reader to devalue it as a resource. Zhang made several decisions that could be interpreted in different ways, and he was vague about them in later life in various interviews. But while the author made him look patriotic and compassionate throughout, sometimes even naive against the indespicable Chiang, one must remember that Zhang is not incapable of duplicity. For example, how does one interpret his back-channel and eventually direct communications with the Communist while serving as the deputy to Chiang who had overall command of the KMT army? How does one look at Zhang's hedging of bets during the Central Plains War (中原大战) as he twiddled his thumbs and decalred that he would support Chiang if Chiang could take Jinan (济南) (pg 185)?

Having said that, this book is actually packed with good facts and information, especially with regards to the dates and events. This shows good research which unfortunately is weakened by an overly anti-Chiang interpretation on the author's part.

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伪满洲国(迟子建)

This is a story about the lives of a cross-section of people in Manchukuo when it existed between 1932 and 1945. The author gave a very broad sweep of people from various social classes to give readers an idea of how people in the different strata of society lived their lives in a state that functioned more like a Japanese colony. All were affected in some ways, the poor more than the rich as the rich inevitably have better connections. But besides being more adversely affected, the poor were also affected much earlier than the rich. For the rich, as long as the Japanese were winning the war, life carried on more or less as it used to be. For the poor though, many were already forced enlisted into the many labour teams used by the Japanese to build the facilities and infrastructure that they needed. The labourers joined up either because they were deceived by the promises of food and lodging or because they had nowhere to hide from the militias going after them. Villagers who were not enlisted fared worst; what was left of their grains were forcibly taken and many were killed indiscriminately.

What makes the book truly a compelling read is how individuals were depicted in the book. Structured into 14 chapters (over the 14 years of Manchukuo's history), each carrying 6 sections, and each section focusing on one person or a group of people as they lived through the years, one can see how lives of different people changed along with the destiny of Manchukuo, or more accurately, Japan. The lives of some of the characters crossed path, while those of others did not, but everyone has a story and collectively,  their stories tell the story of Manchukuo.

With great nuance, the author explored the individuals and how they felt about life then. People like 王亭业 (pg 3) and 张容彩 (pg 26) harboured animosity towards the Japanese, but were careful about expressing their feelings publicly. Pragmatic ones among the populace would cooperate if not for actual rewards which can come in the form of extra food, (see pg 371), then just to stay out of trouble, happy to let others do the resisting (pg 35). But there were others who collaborated, yet where they could, they tried to help their own (pg 434). Of course there were also those who took up arms by joining the militia. Unfortunately in this book, their plight invariably involved a life of hardship, deprivation and in many cases, betrayal leading to torture and death.

Most intriguing to me has got to be the way the author depticted specific Japanese characters. Although there is a general negative portrayal of the faceless Japanese military man, when it came to individuals, the author was a lot more nuanced. There was one that did research on living and dead humans in the notorious Unit 731 (北也南次郎) and had no compunction about watching his subjects suffer the most inhuman treatment, all because of his passion for his research. But he too was to exhibit some feelings especially after establishing a curiosity about Patient 26 (王亭业). His friend 羽田, on the other hand, is perhaps more paradoxical. As a Japanese military personnel, he defied that general image of cruelty and arrogance to always save his feelings for that one special girl who gave him that lucky scarf. Throughout his time in Manchukuo, he did not participate in any of the excesses commonly associated with Japanese soldiers. It makes one wonder about the motives of the author in her inclusion of this character.

One particular character stood out ironically despite his relative immunity from the political and military upheavals. 胡二 started off as a bandit, but after an operation that went wrong largely because of him, he escaped into the mountains with his abducted wife. From then on, his life would have its ups and downs mainly due to his inability to control his libido. This is an interesting character that would be usually missed out in books depicting lives of people in those times for his life was unscathed despite the great political turmoils and human sufferings. For that I credit the author for being able to give the story of Manchukuo a wholesome treatment, almost missing out no one. But more, I credit the author for so skillfully placing this character in the reader's heart. One that would be easy to dislike, if not hate, yet through his love for his family, especially his son, his big-heartedness in his business dealings, and his generousity towards a Japanese fugitive at the end of the story, he redeems himself in the eyes of the reader making the reader feel for him, and if it carries some reluctance, there is a lot more forgiveness.

At the start of the story, an old man gave his two grandsons two halves of a mirror just before they left home to pursue their own careers. They were to reunite the two halves of the mirror as a commitment to their own reunion. Alas, the two halves of a mirror were united, only that they were in the hands of two other people. Like the story of China and Manchukuo, the three north-eastern provinces would eventually reunite with the rest of China, but it would be through a long and tortuous path. And despite all the sufferings and death in the book, one hopes for live to be better.

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张学良与中国 (松本一男/林敏生）

Coming on the heels of another book on Zhang Xueliang (张学良), 张学良与日本， is this book. This is a rather short book of about 250 pages. The first quarter of the book was on Zhang's early life, and therefore has much to do with his father, the warlord Zhang Zuolin (张作霖). Zhang Xueliang came to prominence after his father was murdered by the Japanese and partly motivated by that, he decided to 'change flag' (易帜), that is, to change to the Nationalists' flag in a show of subjugation to them. After he lost his empire to the Japanese in the Manchurian Incident, he became increasingly opposed to Jiang's policy of 'Resisting Foreign Aggression after Stabilizing the Country' (先安内，后攘外), which culminated in the Xi'an Incident (西安事变) resulting in Zhang's five-decade house arrest.

This book was written by 松本一男, a Japanese born in Taiwan. However, when I first started, I wondered who translated the book, was it done faithfully to the original script or was it done by a Taiwanese or a Chinese who skewed the slant of the book towards their national stance on Zhang; the Chinese treat him as a national hero, the Taiwanese, a traitor. Some of the early parts suggested that the Chinese Communist Party might have a hand in it. There were instances when the author was highly critical of the Japanese (e.g., pg 41), in ways that only Chinese would do. Others, like the claim that growing up, Zhang did not even have the slightest affinity to the Japanese (pg. 43) also sounded a little too much like Chinese writing, there was also much criticism of Chiang Kai-shek throughout the book, written in a way contemporary Chinese would. Yet at the end of the book, the author's stance was a lot more unbiased, for example, his opinion that the Xi'an Incident saved the Communist Party from annihilation was not something many in China would admit to readily. Most of all however, is his description of the June Fourth Incident in China in 1989. This would never have made it into print had it been translated by a Chinese.

On the Xi'an Incident, there wasn't a lot written. How Zhang came to be in cahoots with Yang Hucheng (杨虎城) was totally ignored. But the author showed that the general political condition then made it hard for Zhang to hold the line on 先安内，后攘外. This book might be a little dated and so some facts were not firmly established when it was written. It could be for this reason that I found the author careful about being overly certain concerting events that are hard to authenticate. For example what was Zhang doing on the night of when the Manchurian Incident took place? Current accounts prefer to suggest that he was having a good time in the theatre. The author took the more tentative approach of suggesting that it was not conclusive and so two accounts were available. He was also less dramatic in describing Jiang's capture during the Xi'an Incident compared to this other account. On the other hand, what was glaringly inconsistent with common knowledge was his missing out on the fact that Chiang fell and hurt his back while trying to escape during the Xi'an Incident (pg. 176).

Overall though, I feel that the author has done a very commendable job in synthesising and presenting his facts. This can be seen from his triangulation of information with various sources when presenting the account of 'who did what' during the Xi'an Incident. More telling was his handling of the literature surrounding the execution of 杨宇霆 and 常蔭槐. The author commented about the conflicting accounts in the Chinese literature and their tendencies to sensationalise and he therefore decided only consulted overseas literature (pg 85). Another strength of the book was the detailed information on the different sects and warlords (pg. 91) and also the order of battle of Zhang's army.

What was surprising to me was what I thought would be the most boring part of the book turned out to be the most moving. This concerns Zhang's life in house-arrest over the five decades, how he turned from being hopeful of early release to join the fight against the Japanese to his gradual acceptance that it would not happened, yet sprinkled sporadically with unfulfilled hopes when old friends visited him promising to put in a good word for him in front of Chiang; the condition of his living quarters in the different places, where he sometimes could only spend a few months or even weeks because of the Nationalist Army's constant retreat from the Japanese; his general state of his physical and mental health and in the end, how his 'freedom statement' was dictated by the politics of Taiwan, right up to the third president.

This book speculates about Zhang Xueliang's nature and attributed his eventual sympathy with the students' cause in 1936 to the May Fourth Movement which he witnessed as a young man . It is easy for people to feel this way about Zhang for he clearly was more naive than he should be, one need only see his belief that Chiang would not treat him as he did. And from this, one can make a judgement on Chiang.

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西安兵变情恨 （王月曦、薛家柱）

The Xi'an Incident (西安事变) is an important and controversial one in Chinese history. Briefly, on 12 Dec 1936, Zhang Xueliang (张学良), the Young Marshal, incarcerated Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) in Xi'an in order to force Chiang to agree to stop his war against the Communists and to instead work with them to fight the Japanese. Chiang was eventually freed, but Zhang would spend the rest of his life under house-arrest, even after Chiang died in 1975.

This book was written in collaboration with 汪日章 (Wang Rizhang), who was the secretary of Chiang. It is however important to remember that Wang remained in China and together with the fact that the book was originally published in China, it is no surprise that the slant is hugely anti-Chiang, or pro-Zhang. But that aside, this book covers a lot of ground, including the run-up to the incident and the aftermath, much of the facts are also fairly accurate. The style of the authors is engaging and so the reader is treated to a thriller-like narrative of an event that still has some reverberation today.

What I thought was missing was 杨虎城's (Yang Hucheng) role in the whole affair. It is well-known that he is the other party to the abduction of Chiang, and in fact, he and some of his family members were executed by Chiang because of that. But while the book gave much attention to how Zhang was slowly moved towards taking this drastic step, there was no mention of Yang's motivation. I am convinced that for one to take part in such a risky business, he must have gone through a process, which involves some soul-searching and doubts. Zhang would not be the only one to go through it, Yang would have as well. Instead the writers gave the impression that Yang suddenly appeared non-committal after Chiang was detained. This was not an accurate depiction of Yang. First of all, Yang never trusted Chiang, he had insisted on a signed undertaking by Chiang before he should be released, but Zhang did not push it in his negotiations with Soong Meiling. What was worse was the negotiation was done in English, which Yang did not speak (see 往事：杨虎城之子回忆 ). I would be angry in I were Yang.

The Xi'an Incident continues to be debated today, partly because of its significance, partly because Zhang himself appeared to give contradicting views and information on different occasions. All the parties involved are no longer around, but this is only the start of my exploration of this incident and this book has certainly helped in my quest.

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往事:杨虎城之子回忆 (杨拯民 )

I bought this book in the belief that it was a book on 杨虎城 (the collaborator of 张学良 in the Xi'an Incident - 西安事变), more specifically, a recollection of what happened during the Incident. But I was disappointed, it turned out to have only a small chapter on the Incident, and perhaps only about half the book was on 杨虎城 himself. Much of the rest of the book was on the author himself, the son of 杨虎城 and too much of it was on his adulation of the personalities in the Chinese Communist Party and his relationship with different people whom played bit roles in the greater scheme of history but must be mentioned given the Chinese's culture of 'giving face' (给面子). It was until the end of the book that I realised that while the book was written by 杨拯民, it was arranged by his wife after his death and only at the goading of his friends.

However, one does get some rewards making it through the book. For one thing, writing from the perspective of a common man, the reader gets a sense of general attitudes of the people in China in that tumultuous period. For example, if they were indignant towards the Japanese's invasion of China, they continued to want to live their lives as usual. Even the Marco Polo Bridge Incident did not rouse them to want to fight (pg 155), hoping on one hand that this might be the point when the Japanese could be chased out of China, but wishing on the other hand that the Incident would not precipitate a bigger war. This dilemma puts paid to the notion that Chinese were all patriotic.

Brief mentions were given to the Cultural Revolution that happened much later. It is obvious that the author and his wife both suffered greatly during that time. While they were spared of their lives, many of their friends were not. But the author was unwilling to talk more about it, giving only brief mentions of what happened in drips throughout the book and even absolving Mao for what happened - 人非圣贤，孰能无过。 Indeed.

What is more interesting to me was the almost complete lack of mention throughout the book about his or the Communist Party's fight with the Japanese. Yes, this is the autobiography of a single person, he might have been lucky to have escaped having to fight the Japanese. But he spent many years in Yan An (延安), the Communist base and then was posted to various places, yet in none of this was he required to face the Japanese, nor did he talked about anyone who he met who had. It makes one wonder about the scale of the Communists' involvement in fighting the Japanese.

Overall a rather disappointing book, and if you are trying to understand more about the Xi'an Incident, this is not a book that you need to read. But if you are interested in the somewhat ethnographic take on Chinese life, then this provides one view.

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最后的帝国 （恩斯特·柯德士 / 王迎宪）

Ernst Cordes was a German journalist who covered China in the tumultuous period in the 1930's. This book is a travelogue detailing the important trip he made to Manchukuo after its formation in 1931 as a result of Japan's annexation of the three eastern provinces in China, namely Heilongjiang (黑龙江), Liaoning (辽宁) [Used to be named Fengtian, 奉天], and Jilin (吉林). This book was originally published in German in 1936 and the version reviewed here is a translation by Wang Ying Bin (王迎宪).

Although the object of the author's trip was to interview the re-installed emperor, Pu Yi, the section that described that interview was very short, and likely because that was how the interview was. But the interview, while potentially able to provide a good historical record, would not provide readers with the rich account of China (not just Manchukuo) at that time. Fortunately for us, Cordes was conversant in Chinese and was therefore able to communicate with the many common man (老百姓) he met along the way. Add to that his keen sense of observation, and we have a book that is able to paint a most lively picture of what life was like in Manchukuo.

Manchukuo at that time was just going through a spate of construction and this one could easily get from the description provided by the author. The palace where he interviewed Pu Yi was none too grand compared to the Forbidden City the deposed emperor was more used to. More vivid was the 'chicken coop' where the immigration officer worked on the author's arrival. It was a temporary structure hastily constructed while the actual building was being built.

More interesting surely was his description and depiction of the people in Manchukuo. As it happened, Manchukuo was a rather cosmopolitan place. There were the Chinese aplenty, the Japanese predictably, and Russians, surprisingly. The Russians were mainly people who escaped the Russian Revolution and could no longer go back. Each of these races appeared to live separate lives and occupied different strata of the society.

The Japanese were an occupying power, despite all the political theatre of Manchukuo being an independent country, there was no question who was boss. The Japanese were by then a confident and powerful race. Unlike the Chinese, they did not treat Westerners with reverence, and perceiving themselves to be highly superior to the Chinese, they treated the Chinese like dirt. Throughout the book, there were examples of the Japanese's efficiency mixed with brutality. But they also had their quirks (like taking their pants down when they felt hot), but more importantly, their militarism, which even extended to the toys and military-themed candies meant for children.

The author's was at his best however, when he was talking about the Chinese. And if there was one word to describe Chinese live, it was cheap. First of all, then, as with half a century later, Chinese labour could be bought at rock-bottom prices. Already then, the author recognised that at those prices, no European country would be able to match the prices of products coming out of Manchukuo. Secondly, Chinese themselves would gladly give up their lives for a small price. The incredible example of how a general managed to stage a battle with live bullets and real people dying by just offering the winner $500 said it all, this was all done in the name of producing a documentary about the warlords fighting amongst themselves.

If that sounded unbelievable, the description of the everyday life of an average Chinese would substantiate that story. From his own accounts of how the Chinese labourers were treated, to the poverty he witnessed from how the Chinese had to sell their children, to how people were dying in the streets. His description of the filthy restaurant where he had a delicious dinner with the poorest of the Chinese would give one an idea of the general hygiene condition the Chinese put up with everyday.

The best account however, was his own encounter with the bandits who were trying to rob the train he was riding in. Soon after the bandits were repelled by the Japanese soldiers tasked to secure the train, the Chinese passengers seemed to be able to put the whole episode behind them so quickly that it appeared to never have happen (他们谈笑风生). The journalists would later report their disappointment when referring to the incident, saying that "only one baby was killed, everyone else was safe."

Interestingly, throughout the book there wasn't a mention of the Manchus, who were supposed to be of a different race from the Han Chinese. It could be that he could not tell the difference, or more likely, the Manchus had by then been assimilated into the Han race. The author himself made this comment about how Chinese culture is one that easy absorbs another and it appears that the Japanese are the only ones who knew it all along and had deliberately maintain a chasm between themselves and the Chinese. There were few inter-marriages and the few attempts from the more idealistic Japanese to see Chinese as the same (the tea-ist view) ended up in frustration more for the Japanese than the Chinese. If the author failed to discern between the Manchus and the Chinese, he was more than able to aptly describe the difference between the Chinese and the Japanese - 此黄非彼黄。(This yellow is not [the same as] that yellow.) He put it down to the races being 'fundamentally different' (本性差异). Indeed, the Japanese appeared to be a race that was determine to show the world that they were to be reckoned with. The Chinese, on the other hand, appeared to only base their existence on their 5000 years of history and was more than laid back about their lives. The Manchuria Incident (which precipitated the formation of Manchukuo and Japan's eventually withdrawal from the League of Nations) went unchallenged militarily for years. The Chinese themselves, while unhappy about the annexation, nevertheless appeared ambivalent about it (pg 123).

When this account was being written, there was still no agreement on who killed Zhang Zhuolin. Much would eventually happen in China. This book is by no means a scholastic account of China in the early 1930s, it is however a vivid account of what China was through the eyes of a very observant and interested journalist. Capturing a moment in China's history, he served Chinese history enthusiasts greatly by painting a picture of the life of an ordinary Chinese and was able to help one understand the events that would follow later.

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张学良与日本 （臼井勝美/陈鹏仁）

This book was originally published in Japanese coming out of a documentary that NHK made about Zhang Xueliang (张学良), also known as the Young Marshal. Zhang was the son of Zhang Zhuolin (张作霖） the warlord from the northeastern provinces of China. His life was a fascinating one but he was most well-known for the Xi'an Incident (西安事变) where he and his associates abducted Chiang Kaishek and forced him to stop the pursuit of the Communists and instead work with them to fight the Japanese who at that time had occupied Manchuria and had declared it an "independent" country called Manchukuo.

As mentioned, this book was written from the materials and interviews made for the documentary on Zhang and reads exactly like that. While the author had access to Zhang, this book is not a collection of her interview with Zhang. In many places it was written almost like a script for a documentary and in other places the author filled it with materials from other sources. In fact there was surprisingly little from the actual interviews and the most disappointing of all, Zhang refused to divulge anything on what happened in the Xi'an Incident. And honestly, he  had kept his mouth tightly shut about the most important details of the negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Chiang Kaishek in the years after that.

However if one is looking for a source that is easy to read to get all the facts of Zhang's life, this book would be a good reference. It is not one that gives the reader an in-depth understanding of the events because it lacks the analyses of the various events and therefore ended up looking a little disjointed and lacking a central thesis. But to be fair, the author never meant for this book to be one of an analysis of Zhang or any events associated with him, it is simply a documentary turned into a book.

I know of Zhang in my earlier readings but did not find out more about him. If this book has done anything for me, it has piqued my interest in him and he being young in those tumultuous years actually lived long enough to entertain a few video-recorded interviews that are available on YouTube (they are in Chinese though). His history has been presented in almost opposite ways in China and Taiwan. With this book as a start I hope to find out more about him and come to my own assessment of him.

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Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze (Peter Harmsen)

Most Chinese take 7 Jul 1937, the day of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (卢沟桥事变) as the day when China officially went to war with Japan. Immediately after the incident, Chiang Kai-shek found himself out of an excuse to not confront the Japanese on Chinese soil. He decided to make his stand in Shanghai and this book is about that battle, known in the Chinese literature as 淞滬會戰.

At 300 pages, this is a fairly short book by normal standards. The brisk and flowing style adopted by the author made the book an enjoyable read. This book is obviously based on good research and has the merit of showing many good archive pictures. On top of that, it also provides the answer to a question I have had for many years - why do Chinese soldiers that appeared in movies I saw as a child wear German helmets? Does it not make them the bad guys? This book is the only one I have come across that gives a good account of the close relationship between the Chinese government and the Germans, explaining the many German military advisers used by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) in the 1930s.

The author, Peter Harmsen, is particularly good at articulating scenes of various types (although I suspect that this is helped by my own exposure to the pictures and movies I watched as a child). I would point to two examples, the first one was what went on in the Great World Amusement Centre, taking readers into the place itself, almost helping one to see what various vendors were doing. I thought I could hear the music coming out of the crackling grammaphone. The other, in contrast, was the gruesome fighting scenes of death and destruction. I confess again, that being exposed from young to pictures and movies made of that era has helped me to visualise (maybe inaccurately) what the author described, but that should not take anything away from his ability to attend to the smallest yet important details.

There are however lapses that reduces my enjoyment of the book. The prologue talked about the Xi-an Incident in which Chiang was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang, the Young Marshal as he was called, in a bid to force Chiang to come to terms with the Communists to fight the Japanese together. For such an important event, I wonder why the author did not mention it by name, and the greater ommission was Zhang Xueliang's name. Yet he would bother to interject his otherwise flowing narrative with stories that seem to come at the wrong time, or which are of no use to the reader. An example of such was the story on Dai Li (pg 145) which interrupted what was an exciting description of the brutal battle that was going on.

The author also made a strange comment on pg 64 about the tragedy of the Black Saturday. This was when the Chinese bombers sent to bomb the Japanese cruiser Izumo dropped their bombs in the most crowded parts of Shanghai instead, killing only Chinese civilians. The author said that 'the tragedy could have been prevented by Japan.' I cannot appreciate the thoughts behind what he said; was he trying to be sarcastic or ironic, or was he really putting the blame on the Japanese? I hope he had not said it.

That said, the perceptive author provided much for a reader to reflect upon.

The first of these was about the city itself. What was Shanghai really like in that era? If there was a 'limited war', I would say that this battle was the most 'limited' insofar as territory is concerned. With Japan's total restrain concerning the International Settlements, one got the surreal sense that the battle could be raging along one side of a fence maiming people indiscriminately, while on the other side, people, safe behind the fences of the International Settlements, watched on. Foreign reporters could still be staying in a five-star hotel that continued to operate as normal.

But 'limited' is also a misnomer in this battle, as with all others involving the Chinese. For Chinese commanders always seemed to believe that there were unlimited Chinese to die. Those frontal attacks against well-entrenched enemies in movies looked like propaganda, only that they were unfortunately accurate (pg 53). No one was called to account for the fiasco of Black Saturday. A captain, who claimed to be involved in it, even gave an interview to the press and tried to explained why it happened (pg 63).

I also could not help noticing that the one thing the that the Chinese Army seemed to consistently do successfully was to withdraw quietly at night from a salient they held in the day. The Japanese sometimes did not even know until days later. The one exception was battle for the Sihang Warehouse where some 425 Chinese soldiers took a last stand against the Japanese. This battle was described very well in the book.

Overall, this book is a good read. Although I have my complaints, these are probably due to my unfair expectations of it being more scholarly when it was written as a 'popular' history book. This book is recommended if for none other reason than there being very few English language works on the war in China during this era.

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Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost (Jonathon Fenby)

At one time in China's recent history, Chiang Kai-shek came close to unifying and ruling it. This book by Jonthan Fenby talks about the man and provides some insights into why he failed. By taking the readers through the different stages in his life and exploring how he overcame the challenges and treacheries along the way, the author managed to weave an interesting and rather gripping account of Chiang's life in this book.

This book was structured chronologically as with most biographies, but it was also divided into major sections covering Chiang's childhood, the period when he consolidated his power, followed by the time when he ruled from Nanking, to fighting the Japanese proper after Xi-an, and concluding with how Chiang fought and lost the civil war. What I particularly liked was the weights given to the different sections, putting less attention on Chiang's childhood which I am not quite interested in, but a lot more on the most important parts in his life, and then almost nothing on Chiang's life in Taiwan after 1949. In doing so, the author helped readers to focus only on the consequential parts of Chiang's life and avoided diluting his work with less important or interesting details.

A book on an essentially military person, one can expect the book to talk about many military operations, and because of this, maps are important. In this, the author has done a decent job, providing maps of the major campaigns such as the Northern Expedition and the war with Japan, but one can always ask for more.

My complaint is the lack of a glossary. I do not know if the author knows the Chinese language, somehow I suspect that he didn't because he seemed to have quoted from many translated sources instead of providing his own translation and interpretation of the original Chinese words and the lack of a glossary makes this a big problem.  Take for example what is lian zuo fa? Not having the explanation provided, I was hoping that I could at least see the Chinese characters in the glossary, as I would when reading books on China or Japan. But the absence of the glossary means that words and phrases like this become meaningless to most readers. I also feel that the failure to provide the proper context when quoting from Chiang's diaries made some of the things he wrote sounded stupid. For instance, take this sentence quoted from Chiang's diary: "At a time of national humiliation we should lie in faggots and taste gall." "Lying in faggots and taste gall" sounded almost ridiculous at a time of national humiliation, but if one were to know that Chiang actually wrote "卧薪尝胆", he would realise that Chiang was using a Chinese idiom, formulated by someone caught in a somewhat situation in the past. Things like this make me feel that the author was just quoting blindly from a secondary source, without knowing what actually was written.

There were also parts in the narrative of the story that I felt the author did not fill with enough details to let his readers appreciate the actual drama. For example when talking about Wang Jin-wei's formation of a puppet regime in collaboration with the Japanese, the author brought this important event up almost casually despite having talked about Wang on numerous occasions due to his obvious affiliations to Chiang. Mitter (2013) provided a much better description of the intrigue and dilemma Wang faced in taking that fateful step.

Notwithstanding these, the author was successful in directing me to consider some important people and issues surrounding Chiang. Firstly Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Xueliang. Contemporary Chinese history has portrayed these two men very positively; Sun, in particular, is hailed 国父, the father of the nation. Alas, he is but human and has his faults. We were told not only of his lack of political acumen and ability to manage, there were hints throughout that he was even a womaniser (all of which Chiang bettered). Similarly Zhang Xueliang is considered by many as a patriotic figure who risked his life to get Chiang to agree to fight the Japanese rather than the Communists. But one has to remember that Zhang was from Manchuria and has his fortunes tied up there so the possibility of him trying to use the Nationalist army to evict the Japanese from Manchukuo cannot be discounted.

And then there was Soong Meiling, who seemed to mesmerise every man that came into contact with her. I think she was obviously smart, and being educated in the US stood her out from all the Chinese women and most men in China. But almost all descriptions of her was of her beauty, and on occasions with cursory links to the word 'sex'. Current Chinese sentiments of her are not positive, in China for obvious reasons. But even in Taiwan, I do not get the sense of people seeing much in her. In this book, the author's treatment of her was guarded, he acknowledge her contributions and efforts in helping Chiang to rally the Chinese to resist the Japanese and then the Communists. At the same time, he also cited instances of her belligerent behaviours. However not once did he praise or criticise her in his own accords. Praise and criticism always came from other sources he quoted.

In addition to these, the author also talked about Chiang's relationship with the US. It is difficult to fault the US in their handling of their relationship with Chiang. My impression from the book is that the Americans who were on the ground (in China) clearly knew the state of the country, its army, and its leadership. But caught in their own wars in Europe and the Pacific, it was hard to see through the curtain of mist pulled down by Chiang and his relatives (Soong Meiling and T. V. Soong). Eventually they did know who they were dealing with, if for no other reason than Chiang's seemingly insatiable appetite for cash.

The other subject that the author in my opinion rightly put enough emphasis on is that of the warlords. One is able to learn a great deal about them in this book. Not only were descriptions of them scattered throughout the book, depending on when they appeared in Chiang's life, the author also dedicated a chapter to them, it was an educational one.

In so far as Chiang, the subject, was concerned, what the author successfully did was to provide enough information on him to persuade the readers to consider (or re-consider) the person. A lowly peasant-class man by birth, Chiang must be quite something to overcome his unprivileged birth and significant lack of education (at least compared to Soong Meiling) to rise to the position of the person who almost ruled an almost united China. Along the way he had to overcome political enemies, the ever untrustworthy warloards, and even unfaithful relatives. Yet he would lose almost everything to the Communists and his nemesis, Mao Zedong. Many today still think of him as a traitor for not standing up to the Japanese earlier, but he appeared to have a case for going after the Communists first, which was validated by his own defeat in their hands.

Today Taiwan is still in an awkward position in international relations, even though as an entity on its own it is almost self-sufficient, and has a very enterprising, cultured, creative, educated and likeable people. How much of it is due to Chiang? Can one hold Taiwan as an example of what China would be had he succeeded? These are questions readers, especially Chinese readers would think about. But the other question all readers would surely ask themselves is why did Chiang fail? I do not think I can provide an answer, but suspect that this line quoted from the book (pg 349) encompassing a mix of incompetency, delusion, and deceit goes some way into giving a hint.

'Inflation,inflation! There is no inflation in China! If people want to pay twenty five dollars for a fountain pen, that’s their business, it’s not inflation. They’re crazy, that’s all. They shouldn’t pay it.’ H.H. Kung, Finance Minister

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昭和史第一部（下）(半藤一利/林錚顗)

In this second volume, the author concentrated on the early part of 1940 and all the way to 1945 when Japan surrendered after the dropping of the atomic bombs. The style of the author has been discussed in my earlier entry reviewing the first first volume of the work and has remained largely similar. In this volume, whether he meant to do it or not, the central theme is the behaviours of the policy makers and the military personnel in Japan in those years.

Starting from the late 1930s Japan has rearmed, having withdrawn from the League of Nations. They were then caught in something of a quagmire in China and while events in Europe have been increasingly dangerous, the Sino-Japanese War have been left largely as a side-event in the minds of the West. However, one can't help feeling that events in Asia have taken a life of its own. Japan increasingly felt isolated and was under pressure from the US whom exported most of the oil that Japan needed. Japan wanted to avoid conflict with the US and at the same time wanted to find a way to end the war in China for it was already beginning to take its toil domestically. Finding no support from the US, the UK and their other allies, Japan gravitated towards the Axis and finally entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Japan's reason for entering the Pact (suggested by Germany) was not clear nor compelling, indeed there were those in Japan that had not supported Japan's entry into the Pact. But it appeared that those who supported it all did it for their own selfish reasons. Take this entry from Kazushige Ugaki's diary (pg 25) whom the author accused of supporting the Tripartite Pact in order to get more resources for the army. But whatever their personal motivations, one does not get the impression that something this important was seriously considered before the final decision was made.

Another example was how they were ready to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union. One can argue that Japan's involvement in Manchuria was partly due to the need to check the Soviet Union. This got them into a stalemate in China which soured their relationships with much of the rest of the world, and yet later in having to continue the war in China they wanted an alliance with the Soviet Union (after Nomomhan to boot). It is a little hard to square the logic in all these.

Worse was their decision to bomb Pearl Harbor. There was almost a consensus that Japan could not have a prolonged war with the US, including the Admiral Yamamoto who planned the operation. Yet it was almost as if everyone allow one event to lead to another and just went along with it without voicing objections until it was a done deal. The worst of this behaviour would come when Japan wanted to end the war. The way they went about talking about how to go about it and never quite getting down to it was tragically comical. But the author did us a favour by discussing one relatively small event, quoting from two commanders' diaries he showed us why a coming to a decision was hard, even between (or especially between) Japanese.

Referring to the Battle of Kohima when Japan suffered a huge defeat, it appeared that the two commanders Renya Mutaguchi and Masakazu Kawabe knew they stood no chance to winning and their forces were about to be annihilated. Yet both of them would not order a retreat. Post war, this was what they wrote in their respective diaries:

• Renya Mutaguchi: Although I wanted to say that it's already time to quit the fight in Imphal, when these words reached my mouth, I just couldn't get them out. I could only hope that someone would be able to tell from my expression.

• Masakazu Kawabe: I got the impression from Mutaguchi's expression that there was something he wanted to say but just could not bring himself to. I didn't probe, and the meeting ended that way.

Personally I found this to be what was so valuable about the book. It is hard sometimes for us to understand how a nation tactically so superior to many of its adversaries could be so strategically blundering. However when it comes from a Japanese, who incidentally was a young lad during the war and could even remember his job in one of the torpedo factories, one gained this special insight and know, especially for an Asian, that it could very well be us.

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