The Defence of Singapore

This is a series of maps used by the Malaya Command during the Malayan Campaign. One needs to know how big (small) Singapore is in order to appreciate how desperate the last days were.

9 December 1941

15 December 1941

22 December 1941

28 December 1941

20 January 1942

4 February 1942

5 February 1942

8 February 1942

9 February 1942

10 February 1942

12 February 1942

13 February 1942

15 February 1942
Those red question marks.

Japan's Longest Day (The Pacific War Research Society)

This book is about the events that took place in Tokyo twenty four hours before the then Emperor Hirohito's voice came over the Japanese airwaves proclaiming Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and to admonish the Japanese people to 'suffer what is unsufferable'. Little did we know that the whole effort almost did not come to fruition because there were elements within the Japanese Imperial Army that were absolutely opposed to the idea of surrender and would rather see Japan totally destroyed. This book, written by a group of Japanese historians went into the details of what various parties were doing in that twenty four hours, hour by hour.

The book itself is short, and written more like a suspense thriller than a record of history. This makes it easy to read and for me, a hard one to put down. Originally published in Japanese, the translation was admirably done, given that I could still detect the sentimental way of writing in parts of the book. What makes this book successful is how, in the short length and easy style, it makes the reader reflect on the complex nature of the Japanese society, language, and psyche.

Japan, by then, was already reduced to a country with its major cities destroyed, even if not by the atomic bomb, then by the fire bombs. Her people have little, if anything to eat; many do not have shelter and everyone is hoping for the whole war to end. Yet throughout the book, one does not get the sense that anyone has given any thoughts to their plight, those who wanted to hold out cared only about indulging in their spirit to never surrender. Those who counseled accepting the Potsdam Declaration might have wanted to end the suffering, but it was not explicit that this was the main motivation. Rather, it appeared that they wanted to do it because that was the Emperor's wish.

If there was uncertainty among the Allies about what Japan would do, the same could be said about the Japanese themselves. The only institution capable of putting in place the conditions to accept the Potsdam Declaration or to derail it was the army. While it can be argued that the Emperor was the one who made the ultimate call, few had access to him, the common Japanese certainly did not. And so among the ranks of the army, everyone was unsure if a surrender had indeed been ordered. This uncertainty was surely aggravated by the multi-layered Japanese language. Take for example the description of the conversation between the then War Minister and his brother-in-law, one of those who thought Japan should not surrender (pg 113)

Anami paused. His brother-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel Takeshita, raised his downcast eyes. Anami ought to have said, “We officers - ” and the fact that he did not convince Takeshita that Anami had also not reached a final decision.

And so everyone tried to second-guess each other, and it gave the conspirators the opportunity to swing people's opinion in their favour.

But the wildcard was Anami. Japan had a Supreme War Council made up of the Prime Minister Admiral Kantarō Suzuki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenori Tōgō, the Minister of War General Korechika Anami, the Minister of the Navy Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Yoshijirō Umezu, and the Chief of the Navy General Staff Admiral Soemu Toyoda. If the War Minister was to lean towards one direction, it is not hard to imagine where the other three associated with the war machinery would lean too. Although in this instance the Minister of the Navy thought it better to accept the Potsdam Declaration, all Anami had to do was to resign and the others would have to fall in line. The decision would then have to be put off again, whatever the Emperor wished.

It was fortunate that Anami held it together despite his initial reluctance, but there were a few who were important enough in the hierarchy of the army to dissent, and were ready to stage a coup d'état to that end. While it was not one which would succeed, at some point it did come close. Part of their plan called for the internment of the Emperor himself in the palace, which only emphasized the irony that they were the Imperial Guards. At that stage when Anami was already prepared to take his own life and could no longer care about what was going on, it was left to General Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of the Eastern District Army to put the rebellion down.

Perhaps the most vivid way to represent this story is to quote this small section from page 238 of the book:

The War Minister’s official residence was one corner of a triangle in the center of which stood the Imperial Palace. The other two corners were headquarters of the First Imperial Guards Division and headquarters of the Eastern District Army.

The interplay between the three most important parties in the last twenty four hours before Japan officially surrendered was captured thus, all going after the prize, right in the centroid of this triangle. That is why I said that there is something poetic about how Japanese writing. More however, is their description of what became of the attempted rebellion, epitomised by what happened to the two most fanatical leaders (pg 324):

The two offices (Major Hatanaka and Lieutenant Colonel Shiizaki) thrust their declaration into the hands of the passers-by – but the latter did not pause; they passed by.

I am surprise that this book has not gotten more attention than it did among World War II enthusiasts. The surrender of the Japanese was more complex than the dropping of the two atomic bombs, more than the pouring of the Russian forces across the Manchurian border, it almost did not happen the way it did. Was there another atomic bomb to drop to convince the Japanese that more would come if they did not immediately surrender unconditionally? What then? The Japanese almost tripped themselves up with their brand of nuance (language and culture) and their code of honour (which easily led to fanaticism). It was to the credit of the Allies that while the Japanese Imperial War Council was squabbling amongst themselves, bombing was withheld, which though not explained in the book, showed patience on the part of the Allies. Continued bombing might just allow the rebels to convince others that they should go on fighting in order not to fall into the hands of the 'ruthless enemies'.

Reading a book like this would give those making the decisions a reason to pause and to reconsider their next steps. And perhaps more of us should.

(Find this book at Goodreads)