This book features
almost all the people who had a hand in the decision on the US’ involvement in
Vietnam. There was no question that these were the best and the brightest,
which all more makes the reader wonders why the US eventually found herself in the
quagmire. By the end of the book the reader may still not find the answer, but
what he or she will find is a lesson in human folly and how the illusion of
superior ability can lead one to arrogance, or perhaps less, over-confidence,
but ending in hubris nevertheless.
This book
is cleverly structured, the first half featuring one president (and the
presidency) and the second half the next. Under this over-arching framework,
the author added the layers below the presidents, starting with the national
security advisor, secretaries of defense and states, their deputies and
assistants, then the chief of staffs, and finally the ambassadors to South
Vietnam. In some cases these happen to be the same people who worked across the
administrations, in others there were multiples changes. But all the time the
message was consistent – these are the most brilliant people, although in
different ways. Yet there was no denying that these were the best and the
brightest.
And thus
the reader is led to ask – why then did the US eventually slipped into the
Vietnam War which killed more than 50,000 Americans, severely draining the
treasury, divided the country, and lost the country of a lot of its prestige
and goodwill? The author did not provide a simplistic answer to this complex
question, rather, he showed the mixture of personalities, beliefs, politics,
and self-interest that slowly pushes the country deeper and deeper into a
situation from which they could not extricate themselves, even after some have
changed their minds about the US’ involvement.
At the
beginning there were those who did not know what Vietnam was about, besides the
unpalatable fact that it was a French colony which the French should quit, but
would not. But in view of the need for France’s support in Europe a little sweetener
for them in Vietnam is of negligible cost to the US. Then there were those who
framed it with cold-war rhetoric of having to stop the spread of Communism in
Asia. After “losing” China, it would be unthinkable to let the rest of the
dominoes fall. Later it began to look to others like it was a good place to
fight a good war. To be sure, there were those who tried to stop the tide and
where impossible, to at least retard it. But these were in the minority, their
cases always weak and their stance uncoordinated. In the end they were among
the earliest casualties, and the author took us up the hierarchy again, only
this time showing the sequence of the casualties: the ambassadors, the deputy
and assistant secretaries, the secretaries, and ultimately the president
himself. Few came out looking good, those who escaped rather unscathed
politically would look unprincipled in the book.
The author
did not just write a book that recorded the events and the decisions, he wrote
a book to caution decision makers of all kinds. His message is for people to
remember that arrogance has no place even (or especially) among the best and
the brightest, for the game will eventually play you. But the biggest chill
that the author gave me was not the fact that if the best and the brightest can
fall into such a folly what more the lesser beings, it was that it is precisely
when you think you have control of the game that you lose control. When you think
you have resisted the tide because you managed to not give your opponent all
that he wanted, you have actually forgotten what you had to give him in
exchange for that. The illusion of being on top of things will lure you into
the trap. I think this book should be kept handy, not because it would serve as
a reference, but it would serve as a good reminder that even if you think you
are the best and the brightest, you can still be catastrophically wrong. And
then you would have to live with it.
(Find this book at Goodreads)
(Find this book at Goodreads)