Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire (Victor Sebestyen)

1989 was an amazing in the history of the Cold War. It was the year when the satellite states of the Soviet Union in East Europe rid themselves of Communist Parties that have been ruling them for more than 40 years and decided that they deserved a better life. This book, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire by Victor Sebestyen was a very good introductory reader for anyone wanting to have an overview of the events in the various states.

A journalist who covered the events in Eastern Europe in 1989, Sebesteyn was able to capture the mood of what was happening in the various states at that time very well in the book. His pace was brisk, increasingly so as we near the final section of the book detailing the unfolding events in different states. His perspective was not only from that of high politics, or that between the West (particularly the US) and the Soviet Union, but also down to the people's level, as with his description of Anna Walentynowycz and her wrongful dismissal from her job. This has the benefit of informing his readers of the sentiments at the ground, but more interesting was his description of the festering anti-establishment organisations (or lack of, in the case of Romania) in the different countries just waiting for the the right time to strike and how they were harassed before that. In this, it must also be said that the author gave a fair treatment to his subjects, describing their incompetence and ill-preparedness when it was due (e.g., Solidarity's lack of foresight resulting in the arrest of many of its members) and giving praise when it is deserved.

A reader of this book, upon reflection, would not fail to recognise some questions as he reads the book, all of which I cannot address in this review, but would invite readers consider them for themselves:

1. While Gorbachev appeared to be the hero in the book, what did the Russians really think of him?
2. Despite the rhetoric of the Cold War, it appeared that stability meant more to the West than the dissolution of the empire (see how even West Germany was worried about the instability that would be caused by East Germany's ousting of the Communists).
3. Were the Soviets not using the same arguments in deciding whether or not to leave Afghanistan as the Americans when they argued about leaving Vietnam, and perhaps even Iraq - how do you answer to all those who have died? That they died for nothing? This question would no doubt be asked again by future governments, despite the 'black-hole' outcome that inevitably shows up.
4. Does ideology actually matter? No matter how zealous the party apparatchiks were about their ideology, when they came to realise that it could no longer be saved, all went back to their most basic instincts, self-interest. Machiavelli knew something, and Hobbes was right.

This is an ambitious project and for anyone to want to cover so many countries in a 400-page book, the treatment of each country cannot be comprehensive, and thus my comment earlier about this being a book that provides an overview. The author brought in different players, anti-establishment organisations, the rulers in the different countries, the Soviets (especially Gorbachev), and the Americans, both Reagan and the succeeding president, Bush. However he purposely left the critical question unanswered: Why did the empire fall? Was it because of the popular movements driven by the people? Or were the rulers in the various states so weakened by then that they would have imploded anyway? Or was it Gorbachev who decided to embrace Perestroika and Glasnost because he could not longer sustain the Union otherwise (given the hemorrhage in Afghanistan? Or was it the wisdom of Reagan who decided that he should bet on the sincerity of Gorbachev contrary to all the advice that he was receiving (pg. 224)?

More importantly, why would this revolution be successful where others fail. It was only months prior to this that the students in China gathered in Tiananmen demanding change. That failed, brutally crushed. Was it because Chinese would do to their own what Eastern Europeans would not? Twenty years hence the optimistically called 'Arab Spring' fizzled out in some cases and reverted to other dictators in others. What ingredient was missing in these cases?

The author made no attempt to answer the question in the case of the Soviet empire, therefore providing no leads for us to consider these cases.

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Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (Mark R. Peattie)

Ishiwara Kanji was not well-known as an important personality in the literature of WW2. One reason could be his diminished role by the time the Pacific War started. However one can argue that he played an instrumental role in pushing Japan eventually into the war. This is not an implausible argument, the title of the book alludes to this. Japan’s isolation before the war and eventual aggression in South-East Asia and the Pacific had roots in Manchuria. Ishiwara Kanji was one the orchestrators of the formation of Manchukuo (a “state” created by the Kwangtung Army out of Manchuria meant to be a showcase for Japanese colonialism) and should share some blame for what eventually happened to Japan. But today the name Ishiwara Kanji is only associated with two things: his exploits (or insubordination) in the Kwantung Army, and his book "On The Final War".

Though he served in Manchuria in the Kwantung Army, Kanji's obsession was not on the conflict with China, not even Russia, but the US. His thesis was that Japan would eventually go into a conflict with the US since both were pursuing expansionist policies at the same time. His impression that the US was following an expansionist policy was a result of his extension of what happened in the Philippines and also an extrapolation of the increasing power of the US. But he knew that compared to the US, Japanese resources and industrial prowess were meagre and so a protracted conflict with the US would surely be unsustainable. To increase the odds in Japan's favour, Manchuria, with its vast natural resources seems like a good place to exploit, a policy coming straight out of his 'war can maintain war' ideology, thus started his ambitious, bold, and brilliant plan to create Manchukuo. In doing so, he displayed not just the opportunism that later served him, but also blatant insubordination worthy of court martial. Yet this coincided precisely with the rise of nationalism in Japan that had been riding a rising tide since Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The successful exploits of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria generated so much zeal and pride back home that even the Tokyo high command was wary of disciplining him for out-rightly disregarding the command not to escalate matters in China. And so he made his reputation for daring and brilliance, which eventually contributed to his undoing.

Kanji was a prolific writer, and the author of this book, Mark R. Peattie, studied Kanji's writings to develop a picture of how Kanji's own thoughts changed over the years. The picture that emerged was one of an enigma of a man who seemed to hop from one position to another vis-à-vis different countries. For one known as the architect of Manchukuo, his change of heart towards relationship with China and later to his constant warnings about Russia all seemed to make him looked like one who did not appear to have a consistent view of Japan's position in East Asia. However if we were to explore his motives for the change in heart, it would not be difficult to find that these were all considered 'irritants' that must be eliminated in preparation for the Final War - with the US. It was not until near the end of WW2, when he clearly saw that Japan was going to lose the war that he started to shift and declared that continuing the war with the US would only bring Japan to her knees. He was not one to expound 'fighting to the last man', he thought Japan should just surrender and his thoughts were already on rebuilding Japan after the war. An opportunist by nature, he even had the delusions about being asked to serve in post-war Japan for the occupying force.

Unfortunately, by then, he was almost totally out of favour and no one wanted to listen to him. There were a few reasons for this. Firstly, his transgressions during his time in the Kwantung Army, though applauded by many, were resented by some in the Tokyo high command. While they could not do anything to him earlier, they did not forget the humiliation. When the chance came, they seized upon it to sidelined him. Secondly, while he was originally idolised by many young officers for his exploits in Manchuria, his refusal to support them during the Young Officers' Revolt also made them feel that he had sold them out, giving them the inspiration to 'do the right thing' but hanging them to dry when they did it. He was in fact the one given the responsibility to deal with the young officers in revolt. Finally, he lost himself in his big ego, particularly after he was not punished but commended for his actions in Manchuria. He thought he was above military regulations and was openly criticising higher decisions and policies so much so that he became "an embarrassment". That he finally was not even tried for war crimes in the Tokyo Tribunal attests to how much his influence had waned in the closing years of the war.

This is a well-researched book, focusing on just the right bits of Ishiwara Kanji's life, starting from the time he joined the Kwantung Army till the end of his life in 1949, only some 20 years. Some readers may prefer a more comprehensive work that details more of his life, and I think these are probably available in Japanese. For my purpose, this is good enough. The author has an academic way of writing which does not make for easy reading. But the author structured the book well, focusing on major subjects rather than chronology, making it easy for those who want to study the various aspects of Kanji's life, be it his stint in various commands and positions, or his writings. What are invaluable about this book are the analyses the author added at the end of every chapter, culminating in a final chapter that encapsulates the author's overall evaluation of his subject. Given the dearth of English literature on much of Japan's war in East Asia, this old book is an important resource for those seeking to understand the events of the time. More importantly, for those who want to see how broken down the political system and army discipline had been in Japan in that era, the subject of this book could not have epitomised it better.

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