A journalist who covered the events in Eastern Europe in 1989, Sebesteyn was able to capture the mood of what was happening in the various states at that time very well in the book. His pace was brisk, increasingly so as we near the final section of the book detailing the unfolding events in different states. His perspective was not only from that of high politics, or that between the West (particularly the US) and the Soviet Union, but also down to the people's level, as with his description of Anna Walentynowycz and her wrongful dismissal from her job. This has the benefit of informing his readers of the sentiments at the ground, but more interesting was his description of the festering anti-establishment organisations (or lack of, in the case of Romania) in the different countries just waiting for the the right time to strike and how they were harassed before that. In this, it must also be said that the author gave a fair treatment to his subjects, describing their incompetence and ill-preparedness when it was due (e.g., Solidarity's lack of foresight resulting in the arrest of many of its members) and giving praise when it is deserved.
A reader of this book, upon reflection, would not fail to recognise some questions as he reads the book, all of which I cannot address in this review, but would invite readers consider them for themselves:
- While Gorbachev appeared to be the hero in the book, what did the Russians really think of him?
- Despite the rhetoric of the Cold War, it appeared that stability meant more to the West than the dissolution of the empire (see how even West Germany was worried about the instability that would be caused by East Germany's ousting of the Communists).
- Were the Soviets not using the same arguments in deciding whether or not to leave Afghanistan as the Americans when they argued about leaving Vietnam, and perhaps even Iraq - how do you answer to all those who have died? That they died for nothing? This question would no doubt be asked again by future governments, despite the 'black-hole' outcome that inevitably shows up.
- Does ideology actually matter? No matter how zealous the party apparatchiks were about their ideology, when they came to realise that it could no longer be saved, all went back to their most basic instincts, self-interest. Machiavelli knew something, and Hobbes was right.
This is an ambitious project and for anyone to want to cover so many countries in a 400-page book, the treatment of each country cannot be comprehensive, and thus my comment earlier about this being a book that provides an overview. The author brought in different players, anti-establishment organisations, the rulers in the different countries, the Soviets (especially Gorbachev), and the Americans, both Reagan and the succeeding president, Bush. However he purposely left the critical question unanswered: Why did the empire fall? Was it because of the popular movements driven by the people? Or were the rulers in the various states so weakened by then that they would have imploded anyway? Or was it Gorbachev who decided to embrace Perestroika and Glasnost because he could not longer sustain the Union otherwise (given the hemorrhage in Afghanistan? Or was it the wisdom of Reagan who decided that he should bet on the sincerity of Gorbachev contrary to all the advice that he was receiving (pg. 224)?
More importantly, why would this revolution be successful where others fail. It was only months prior to this that the students in China gathered in Tiananmen demanding change. That failed, brutally crushed. Was it because Chinese would do to their own what Eastern Europeans would not? Twenty years hence the optimistically called 'Arab Spring' fizzled out in some cases and reverted to other dictators in others. What ingredient was missing in these cases?
The author made no attempt to answer the question in the case of the Soviet empire, therefore providing no leads for us to consider these cases.
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