Books on this subject always seek to understand why Singapore fell and who to blame for it. This one is no different, but it adopts a more macro perspective. Some of the grounds he covered were not new and were also in other books that I've read. Examples of these are the deployment of war materiel (vis-a-vis what was going on in Europe and North Africa), the failure to activate Operation Matador, and the leadership of Percival and Brooke-Popham. What is of value in the book is the author's discussion of things that are novel (to me). First of these is the role of the Thais in this fiasco.
That Operation Matador was to be on Thai soil is well-knowned. What is seldom discussed is the role of Thailand. Caught between an obviously aggressive and ambitious power and an old imperial power which, while slowly declining, was still a huge force to be reckoned with, the Thais tried to navigate by duplicity; on the one hand declaring that they will resist any intrusion into their territory, while on the other, hedging their bets by seeking protection both the powers (pg 90). In the end the British's concern that they would be seen as aggressors scuttled Matador, the Japanese, however, would have no such worries. The Thais gave a token resistance and soon the way was open to the Japanese to go down to Malaya.
Secondly, the author also brought into view a few somewhat obscure figures who appeared to have played important parts. Brigadier Ivan Simson, the Chief Engineer, though not unfamiliar, did not appear prominently in the other books I have read so far. In this book his role in planning for the defence of Singapore was given good coverage. He was frustrated in his attempts to build a more durable defence, but his introduction into the book gives the readers an idea of this added dimension in the defence of Singapore and why she ultimately fell to the Japanese.
More interestingly is the introduction of C. A. Vlieland, the Secretary of Defence. This is one civilian who was never mentioned in any book, but who was quite prescient in his assessment of what would happen to Singapore if the Japanese struck. His views of how the defence of Singapore should be coordinated among the various factions of the civlian population and the military would have served the defence purpose well had it not been undermined later by the then GOC Malaya Command, Lieutenant-General L. V. Bond. Those interested in the Malayan Campaign should find out more about Vlieland.
Talking about the 'various factions of the civilian population' would lead us naturally to the third novelty the author brought to this discussion, the issue of race in Malaya. This is one issue that is largely ignored in the literature and perhaps one that is too sensitive to include. But this author tackled it with commendable academic honesty.
Simplistically, there were five races of people in Malaya and Singapore then, the Europeans, Malays, Chinese, Indians and Eurasians. The big question that the book discussed was whether the locals (latter four of the five) should be enlisted in military defence of Malaya. Loaded in this question are the issues of the British's belief of 1) the attitude of the locals towards the Japanese and therefore their attitude towards being ruled by another imperial power, 2) the capacity of the locals to be trained into a credible defence force, and 3) whether there is a difference between the different races towards the first two questions.
Of the four groups of locals, the last two were perhaps too small in numbers to make a discussion meaningful. The Malays received some rather disparaging remarks about their abilities (pg 255) but would go on to give a good account of themselves in several battles (Bukit Chandu being a well-known example). The Chinese, would interestingly be viewed as potential Communist and were not really trusted (pg 185, 250, 255). Events in the decade after the war would prove this view to be of some merit, but at that time the failure to deploy these people was a waste. It probably would not have changed the course of the campaign, but might have bought more time which might just have made a difference. We were reminded in the book that by the time the Japanese reached Johore, they were so low in ammunition that there was event talk that they might have to surrender (pg 174).
Perhaps the most important thing the author did for me was to clarify that Singapore was not really important to the Japanese in the whole scheme of things. Peninsula Malaysia was a lucrative territory to gain for its rubber and tin. The main target however, was the oil in the East Indies. Singapore might at most have been a public-relations victory, strategically, Singapore was of no value. Indeed, the loss of Singapore did not create much of a consternation in London (pg 15), there were more important things nearer home to worry about.
The author ended the book with a very interesting paragraph, referring initially to the contents in the diary of a dead Japanese soldier:
No purely military or strategic advantage can be compared to what those illustrations represented not only for the Japanese soldier who carried the diary, but also for the peoples of Asia. Clumsily, cruelly, hesitantly, he liberated them from the domination of Great Britain and her European allies. Even when Japan was defeated, she had made it impossible for the Allies to return to Asia on their own terms. (pg 263)This paragraph carried two important ideas. The first one was similarly expressed by Eri Hotta in her book Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945: the Japanese actually believed in their justness cause, they just failed to execute it properly. Those who knows the language and were more familiar with the culture appear to believe this to be true - the intention was good, the execution was poor. Personally, I think there were grounds for the Japanese to believe that their culture was superior in comparison to the the peoples of Asia (China and South-East Asia), but at least in the case of the Malayan Campaign, I do not believe that the motivation was liberation and then infusion of a superior culture.
The second one was the upshort (a word the author use frequently) of the war, whoever won or lost militarily, the people's desire for self-determination was awaken. This might not be the original intention of the Japanees, but it happened, and worked in some cases and failed in many others. The legacy of the campaign would be long and impactful.
Overall an important book that contributes to the body of knowledge on the Malayan Campaign. I am somewhat surprised that it is not more read by those who are interested in this history. Granted, its description of the actual battle was not detailed or graphical, but that was not the intention of the author in the first place. The knowledge gained from reading this book is in no way inferior to many other books and the rich appendices in this book makes it invaluable to a researcher into this part of history.
(For this book at Goodreads)
