Professor Tong was born in China in 1920 and was in his teens in the tumultuous years when China was resisting Japan. He attained his PhD in Columbia University and stayed on in the US, becoming a naturalised citizen. This background is important because being an American citizen, he had the freedom to write without having to take sides, Chinese or Taiwanese. This is an important quality when one writes about China's modern history, for both sides (less the Taiwanese nowadays) try to narrate the story from their own perspectives, leaving one an incomplete if not biased picture of the history not made up by the narrative from the other side.
Although a collection of essays, Prof Tong's position is a consistent one and the chronoligcal arrangement of the essays makes following the events easy. To the author, once the Japanese were given a foothold on the Asian mainland, opportunities were abundant for all kinds of conflict with the Chinese armed forces, and the Japanese (especially the Kwantung Army) made use of it to the fullest (pg. 21), culminating in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that kicked-off the Second Sino-Japanese War proper. However, the situation following the incident was not only a series of battles, there were also political intrigues and double-crossing. The most famous of these no doubt is Wang Jingwei's defection from the KMT setting up an alternative government in the fallen Nanjing. A good number of chapters dealt with this and since one of the players was Prof Tong's father-in-law, his account of the incident has added weight. The value of these few chapters is not just in the special insights he was able to give, but his good analysis of why Wang is today considered the traitor of the first order. And it is just as well that a significant part of this book is on this treachery for if there is a thread running through the book, it is that of duplicity.
Besides Wang's own betrayal, there was also Chiang himself dabbling in such some rather dubious episodes when the need arises. His own management of the situation with the Japanese is a case in point. On the one hand he whipped up the nationalistic fervour among the students but on the other he sent his agents to talk peace with the Japanese (pg. 30). A similar ploy was employed when he was dealing with the Americans. At that stage though he was deep in the war with the Japanese, when it suited him, he would intentionally give the Americans the impression that he might seek a separate peace with the Japanese (pg. 303) just so that he could continue to blackmail the Americans.
However, the most chilling instance of betrayal of all was how Stalin might have dealt with China. It is not generally known, but it was said in the book (pg 261) that Stalin contemplated a deal with Japan in which they would split China into two, much like how he and Hitler split Poland. This is not something beyond Stalin, and if it happened, the history of China and indeed, the Second World War would be different. In the end, the only ones that seem to be straight-dealing are the Germans. (There is a story about the Oskar Trautmann, ambassador of Germany to China that bears reading, pg. 170).
Having been brought up on a diet of Western scholastic journals, I was rather amused by the style of Prof Tong. The Chinese language, like English, has been increasingly 'simplified' to make it 'user-friendly'. Prof Tong however, continued to write in a more traditional way and while sacrificing
'user-friendliness', he has shown me how the Chinese language, when used correctly, can be economical but elegant. Yet at the same time, he used words that one would never see in Western scholastic work, such as the Chinese version of 'bullshit' (pg. 257).
Prof Tong gave a balanced in writing this book, being a scholar who must have intimate contact with colleagues from China, Taiwan and Japan, he has honed the skills required to carefully present his case while avoiding unnecessarily upsetting anyone. Despite that, when he thinks that his case is strong, he would not hesitate to say it for what it is. As an example, he was not afraid to give an unflattering description of the KMT soldiers (pg.13) or to smash the common CCP narrative of how much they contributed in resisting the Japanese (pg. 270). Yet at the same time, where credit is due, he would not be stingy about it (pg. 174). Similarly, while he obviously had great respect for the Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang (whom he had a chance to interview), he was quite ready to say that Zhang was naive (pg. 183) and even rash (pg. 353) in .
The author was obviously learned, just a clarification on whether the Marco Polo Bridge was supposed to be 《卢沟桥》 or 《芦沟桥》could be the subject of a paper that quoted very good examples. His own experience as a teenager in the war, his relations to people who were important players in those days, and his work as an oral historian all contributed to his huge base of knowledge. Add to this his very interesting and engaging style, I find his books well-worth reading and cannot wait to start on his other books in my collection.
"The reporter knows nothing but probes persistently hoping to hit the sweet spot which will induce the interviewee to start talking. The researcher, on the other hand, starts with a hunch. He probes in the hope of hitting the sweet spot which will cause the interviewee to bottle up, and that's it, the hunch is confirmed."
- Prof Tong on the difference between a reporter and a researcher (pg. 105)
(Find this book at Goodreads)
